AMERICAN SECURITY AND ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS

BY EDWARD S. MASON

THE foreign policy of the United States appears to have two primary political objectives: the maintenance of peace, if possible; and, if this becomes impossible, the maximization of military effort against its enemies. This duality of purpose raises a number of perplexing questions. If we could assume with Clausewitz that the making or avoidance of war simply involves a choice between means—the end being given—,then these questions would disappear. As it is, we have to recognize that in fact the pursuit of peace may well involve actions which tend to diminish United States military potential and that attempts to maximize military potential may well increase the possibility of war. Under these circumstances only a compromise solution seems sensible. We must consider best how peace may be maintained, but be ready to reject those methods which would leave the United States defenseless in the event that war cannot be avoided.

Economic considerations bulk large in connection with both these objectives.[1] The development of a maximum military potential involves economic calculations at every turn. So also does the choice among economic alternatives affect in many ways the prospect for peace. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the analysis will be limited to certain economic elements involved in the maximization of war potential.

It is useful to distinguish between the strategic and economic considerations affecting national defense. The strategic considerations may be regarded primarily as matters of space and geographical position. The economic factors would have to do with supply of *matériel*. It is obvious, however, that the two

[1] Pursuit of the political objectives of preparedness and peace may interfere with the maximum attainment of prosperity. For present purposes, the absolute priority of these two political objectives over any economic objectives of foreign policy is taken for granted. With Adam Smith, it is assumed that defense is more important than opulence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factors are interdependent. The choice of strategic objectives depends substantially on the quantity of military resources available; strategic considerations, in turn, will heavily influence the volume and character of the requirements imposed on the economic system. The strategist recognizes this interdependence when he speaks of "trading space for time." The economist refines the conception when he says that what is substituted are the military resources which it would take time to organize and produce.

It is out of this interdependence that there arise some of the most complex questions involved in maximizing war potential. And it is the necessity for reconciling strategic and economic considerations which makes it both difficult and important to answer the particular question: "What bearing has control of the sources of raw material supply on the military potential of the United States?"

The Economic Raw Material Base in Peace and War

For ordinary peacetime production the United States depends on raw material supplies from every part of the globe: tungsten from China, mica and burlap from India, copper from Chile and West Africa, graphite from Madagascar, and so on. If raw material interest be defined in terms of the effect of the availability of a particular source of supply on national output, then it is obvious that we have raw material interests—which are a part of economic interests more broadly defined—everywhere. And in order to estimate the extent of our interest in a particular source of supply we should have to take into account the possibilities of substitution in the event that this source were cut off. Now the possibilities of substitution are usually very numerous. The same raw material may be drawn from other geographic sources; scrap yields in the United States may be increased; other materials may be substituted in various uses; finished items may be redesigned to eliminate entirely the need for this material, and so forth. If the possibilities of substitution are fully exploited it will usually be found that any deficiency can be made good. But—and this is the point to be stressed—making good the deficiency involves a cost.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The cost should properly be measured as the amount by which national output would be reduced—all possibilities of substitution having been exhausted—if a particular source of raw material supply were cut off. Since the factor which ultimately limits national output is the supply of available labor, the extent of our interest in a particular source of raw material supply can be roughly measured by the increased labor requirements necessitated by the elimination of this source. If this measure is applied it will no doubt be found that the economic interest of the United States in certain raw materials and in various geographical sources of supply is sufficient to justify careful planning in peace to assure their availability in time of war. Planning is equally important in avoiding or minimizing the loss of time that may be involved in any process of substitution.

A number of ways of assuring wartime supplies of scarce materials are at hand: the material may be stockpiled; domestic sources may be reserved for military use; domestic sources for all uses may be conserved by limiting peacetime exports or encouraging peacetime imports; technical problems involved in substitution may be overcome by peacetime research in preparation for the eventualities of war. How far any or all of these measures should be carried is a question that can be answered only by examining particular raw material situations. It goes without saying that a study of these problems is important and that the steps necessary to assure the availability of scarce raw materials should be taken.

All this is too obvious to require extended discussion. But let us take a further step and ask whether there are raw material interests so vital to the defense of the United States as to require, in time of war, a diversion of military resources for their protection. The answer depends upon the area that the United States will be called upon to defend. It is generally accepted that such an area would for strategic reasons include as a minimum, North America, the Caribbean, and the northern half of South America. If we control this space, it can be said with some confidence that the United States has no outside raw material interests to which substantial military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resources need be diverted.[2] It must be remembered that we are talking here in terms of a minimum. The larger the strategic area required by the armed forces, the easier it becomes to substantiate the case.

In order to demonstrate the truth of this proposition conclusively, it would be necessary to show either or both of the following: (1) that the loss of any or all of raw material supplies from outside this area would, after full allowance is made for substitution, involve a relatively small loss in the output of war material; (2) that the defense of any or all sources of raw material supply outside the strategic area would involve the diversion of military forces from important strategic objectives. It is probably impossible, for lack of relevant facts and figures, to prove this case by direct evidence. However, the indirect evidence appears to be sufficiently strong to carry conviction.

Before discussing this evidence, it is pertinent to emphasize one thing: it is almost inevitable that the military will, on this sort of question, receive poor advice from civilian specialists. This is so for two reasons. The civilian expert, by the nature of his job, is bound to have an inflated estimate of the importance of the materials with which he is concerned. During war he is faced on all sides by shortages; he is assailed by clamors from processors all of whom insist that their requirements are vital. Even though infinite possibilities of substitution exist no one wants to substitute, and all insist that without the material in question their plants will have to shut down. Consequently the raw material specialist comes to the conclusion that if we don't get that next shipload of graphite from Madagascar, if we don't hold on to the New Caledonian supply of nickel, if the North African sources of the supply of red squill fall into enemy hands, the war production of the United States will be doomed. The possession of these areas consequently becomes to him a vital economic interest.

In the second place, the raw material specialist has no proper estimate—nor can he be expected to have—of what the cost

[2] In the following discussion, the sources and requirements of raw material for atomic warfare are neglected. The author, through lack of knowledge, is not prepared to assess the significance of this omission.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to our war effort would be of diverting military resources from strategic to economic objectives. Surely, it may be taken for granted that the overall military objective is the destruction of the armed strength of the enemy and that this requires a substantial concentration of our own striking force. If the military listened seriously to the clamor of raw material experts, they would probably so disperse our military resources in the defense of this, that, and the other "vital" economic interest that no effective striking force could be assembled.

The proper objective of economic planning and economic policy is thus the elimination of "vital" economic interests. If the planning is ably done, the whole of the armed strength of the United States should be available for the attainment of military objectives. Any serious dispersal of strength for the defense of economic objectives should be considered to be a failure of economic policy.

Returning now to the main argument, what is the evidence that the loss of any or all of the sources of raw material supply lying outside the strategic defense area of the United States would not seriously handicap our war production? The evidence, as has been indicated, is chiefly indirect, and the principal witness for the defense is Germany. It is unnecessary to undertake quantitative estimates of German war production. It will, perhaps, be admitted that Germany waged quite a sizeable war for a period of almost six years. It will certainly be admitted that Germany waged this war with quantities of raw materials that were incredibly small in comparison with the quantities available within the strategic area of the United States. Germany's supplies of iron and steel, coal, aluminum, magnesium, lead and zinc, although not large by our standards, were adequate for both military and civilian requirements. Her supplies of petroleum products and rubber, though heavily dependent on synthetic production, were also adequate for military and essential civilian needs, at least until the final year of the war. Supplies of copper, tin and all the ferro-alloys were ludicrously small by our standards. Yet Germany managed, by exploiting the possibilities of substitution to the full, to meet her own war requirements and the essential civilian requirements in Germany and Europe for the whole period of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the war. It is worthwhile looking at the consumption of these metals by Germany beginning with 1938, through 1944.

*German Consumption of Metals, 1938-1944**
(in thousands of metric tons, metal content)

	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Copper	448.3	324	292	392	238	221	219
Tin	20.4	6.8	8.5	10.9	8.3	9.5	7.7
Ferro-alloys							
Nickel	12.4	10.1	11.6	9.2	8.0	9.4	9.5
Molybdenum	.....	3.4	2.2	2.2	1.8	0.8	0.7
Chrome	27.4	48.1	35.3	43.3	38.4	38.7	42.4
Manganese (ore)	135.9	.....	130.2	152.1	124.1	178.5	.....
Wolfram	4.3	4.2	3.7	3.4	3.0	2.2	1.5
Vanadium	0.7	.....	0.8	1.4	1.8	3.0	.....
Titanium	4.9	.....	5.9	7.1	8.5	9.2	.....

* The data comprising this table were assembled by the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* from the following German sources:
(a) *Statistische Schnellberichte zur Kriegsproduktion, Hauptabteilung Planstatistik, Planungsamt* (Speer Ministry);
(b) *Monatliche Rohstoffübersichten, Statistisches Reichsamt, Abtg. VIII;*
(c) *Statistische Zusammenstellung, Metallgeschaft, A.G.*

During this period when German consumption of these "essential" materials remained almost constant, German production of finished military items increased three to four-fold. The production of aircraft increased from 8,000 in 1939 to 40,000 in 1944; tanks from 750 in 1939 to 3,900 in 1944; and the output of weapons and ammunition tripled.

Although annual consumption of copper in the United States during the war years was approximately ten times the German consumption, and American consumption of tin nearly twenty times the German, it is interesting to note that German stocks of these metals increased throughout the war and were more than twice as great at the end of 1944 as at the end of 1938. American consumption of all the ferro-alloys was a multiple of German consumption, ranging from about 10 in the case of manganese ore to 40 or 50 in the case of nickel.

It is quite clear from all this that Germany managed to fight a first-class war on very small quantities of "essential" raw materials. How was it done? The answer embraces a wide range of devices: substitution of plentiful for scarce metals,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

redesign of equipment eliminating or curtailing scarce metal requirements, extensive collection of scrap, paring of civilian requirements. The overall economic effect of the shortages that required these methods was no doubt an increase in labor requirements per unit of finished output. The point is, however, that this increase was not enormous; it was rather easily held to manageable proportions. In a few cases—but the number is very few—there is some evidence that the quality of the finished product deteriorated. This deterioration, however, does not seem to have impressed those who had to face German equipment on the battlefield. The moral, for our purpose, seems to be that the potentialities of raw material substitution and replacement in a modern economy are enormous.

British and American technical intelligence services have by now collected a large body of information concerned with Germany's management of the problem presented by raw material shortages. A careful examination of this information will obviously help to understand the problem with which we are here concerned. Dipping briefly into these sources one comes up with this kind of finding:

At the beginning of 1942 German locomotives required 2.3 metric tons of copper. By the middle of 1943 these requirements had been reduced to 237 kilograms, a reduction of approximately nine-tenths.

The quantity of copper used in U-boats was reduced during the war from 56 to 26 tons on the average.

Iron radiators were substituted for copper radiators in all German motor vehicles.

The use of alloy steel was virtually eliminated in railway car construction. The very difficult problem presented by shortages of ferro-alloys was reduced to manageable proportions largely by the substitution of the relatively plentiful alloys—vanadium and silicon—for the less plentiful. Vanadium, for example, was substituted for molybdenum in gun tubes under 21 cm. Nickel was replaced by vanadium in gun tubes 10.5 cm. and under.

New processes were devised to make possible the working of lower grade ore supplies, as in the case of chromium ores from the Balkans. Perhaps most important of all, the very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

large quantities of scrap, which exist in any highly industrialized economy, were systematically collected and utilized.

It is not pretended that the German management of raw material shortages was accomplished without cost. Obviously labor requirements were substantially increased and in a few cases some sacrifice in quality of finished product was involved. The loss of time involved in substitution must also be taken into account. The point, however, is that the additional labor requirement imposed by raw material shortages made up a small percentage of the total labor requirements of a war economy.

A consideration of economic interests raises problems that are essentially quantitative. The real question, however, is, how important is a particular interest? The criteria lie first, in the loss of output involved in a sacrifice of this interest, all possibilities of substitution having been exploited; and secondly, in the size of the military force that, in time of war, would need to be diverted from other uses in order to protect this interest. Applying these tests to sources of raw material supply lying outside the strategic area of the United States it is difficult to find anything entitled to be called a vital economic interest. If all these sources were eliminated—a very drastic assumption—the increase of manpower requirements involved in the substitution of other sources and other materials, would probably be small in comparison with total wartime manpower requirements. On the other hand, the diversion of military resources required to defend even a limited number of these external sources of raw material supply might well be large.

The Case of Oil

A possible exception to this generalization may be offered in the case of Middle Eastern oil. It will, perhaps, be worthwhile examining this case in some detail. The experts tell us that, at current rates of consumption, the proved oil reserves of the United States will last no more than 14 years. Since, however, the extent of proved reserves continues to be increased by exploration, we should have to add an unknown number of years to this estimate. Moreover, the strategic area

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the United States includes the Caribbean with its sizeable oil reserves. It is impossible to say how long the oil resources of the Western Hemisphere, proved and unproved, would last at expected rates of consumption but even a very cautious estimate would put it at not less than 25 years.

Although rates of consumption will certainly increase it must also be noted that current consumption includes substantial though diminishing exports of oil from the Western Hemisphere to other areas. We are exploiting our oil reserves at a rate much greater than is desirable or necessary. It is obviously to our national interest that the reserves of other areas, and particularly of the Middle East, which has by far the largest, should be developed and that the rest of the world should be supplied from these sources rather than from the Western Hemisphere. It is even possible to supply a part of our own requirements from imports rather than from oil produced in this hemisphere. By these methods the life expectancy of Western Hemisphere reserves could be very greatly strengthened.

Finally, there is the question of substitutes, immediately of synthetic petroleum, and ultimately, perhaps, of other forms of energy. Apparently, in the years immediately before the war, the cost of synthetic petroleum was approximately three times the cost of the natural product as produced in the United States. Technical development has already narrowed the gap between the cost of the synthetic and natural products, and promises to do so further. It is quite probable, therefore, that synthetic petroleum will come forward as an effective substitute before our reserves of natural petroleum are exhausted. It is to be regarded as altogether probable that if, twenty-five years from now, we had to depend substantially on synthetic supplies to meet military requirements, and if adequate preparations had been made for this eventuality, the addition to labor requirements involved would be found to be remarkably small.

What the argument adds up to is this: It is extremely important for the United States to have an oil policy, but it does not follow that Middle East oil is a vital economic interest in the sense that military resources should be allocated to this area for its defense. Indeed, the principal objectives of a na-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional oil policy should be, first, the conservation of Western Hemisphere resources, partly by the acceleration of oil development elsewhere, and secondly, the alleviation of friction among the great powers in the exploration and development of oil resources. An effective pursuit of this policy would probably dispose of Middle Eastern oil as a vital economic interest of the United States.

Of course the possibility of finding that Middle Eastern oil lies within the strategic area of the United States should not be excluded. If a Western Alliance were to be composed of Great Britain and the countries of western and southern Europe, it is conceivable that for strategic rather than for economic reasons we would have to protect the area. That would be up to the military. But given adequate preparation, and given such a Western Alliance, it is equally conceivable that we could exclude the Middle East from our catalogue of vital interests and still supply our allies as we did during the last war.

Defense of the Strategic Base

Up to this point a sharp distinction has been drawn between economic interests outside and inside the strategic defense area of the United States. Attention has been limited to raw material interests, and the discussion has turned upon our ability to reduce military commitments outside the strategic defense area to a minimum. But it is obvious that the separation of a strategic defense area from other space had more significance in the time of Mahan than it has today. With the development of air and underwater methods of attack, military frontiers both on land and water tend to lose clarity of definition. Consequently it becomes necessary to examine economic interests within as well as outside of our strategic defense area. As soon as economic interests within this area come into question, it becomes clear that there are interests that are vital in the sense that their defense may well justify the diversion of military resources. This is so for two reasons: (1) there are sources of supply, but particularly plant installations, whose destruction would be a more severe shock to the economy than would be the cutting off of any given external source of supply;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) the military resources required for the special protection of these sources or installations may be assumed to be relatively small as compared with the resources necessary to defend most positions outside our strategic area.

The protection of the bauxite routes from the Guianas to American ports, or ore passage through the Great Lakes, and of a large number of plant installations throughout the United States no doubt merits the diversion of certain quantities of military resources. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that military objectives have priority and, unless the claims to protection of various economic interests are scrutinized with the greatest care, it will be easy to fritter away the possibilities of offensive action.

During the war a great deal of attention was given to economic objectives in the selection of air targets. This analysis though mainly directed toward objectives in enemy territory has of course equal applicability to the selection of those installations in our own territory which it is most important to defend from enemy air attack. Although substantial progress was made during the war in refining the analysis, much can still be done. The techniques are mainly available and only need to be carefully applied. The problem is essentially one of estimating the interdependence among various kinds of quantities in an economic system. What one would like to know is what effect the destruction of a particular installation or source of supply would have on the output of various types of finished products and within what period, taking account of the possibilities of substitution. This is a problem for which careful economic analysis can yield results much more accurate than anything accomplished in the field of target selection during the war.

In fact, this seems to be one of those cases in which the expenditure of a few hundred thousands of dollars in peacetime on scientific research, taking care that the findings are always kept up to date, could save billions in time of war by avoiding a faulty allocation of military resources in the defense of economic objectives at home or in the attack on economic objectives in enemy territory. Such a project may be justified by quoting language already used: the purpose of economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analysis and economic policy geared to national defense is to eliminate or minimize those economic interests that need to be defended. The purpose of economic analysis and policy vis-à-vis the enemy is to avoid an expenditure of military resources on economic objectives of little or no significance.

Economic Warfare

Since the economic factor looms so large in military calculations, and since the determination of a strategic area may well result in part from economic requirements, it is worth examining the overall effectiveness of the economic weapon in war. One gets the impression that during World War I the accomplishments of economic warfare were much greater than in World War II, despite the enormously increased use of air power in the attack on economic objectives in enemy territory. This was so for two principal reasons. In the first place, in the earlier conflict the enemy was really confined to a narrow space. An elaborate series of measures ultimately depending on sea power caused him to be effectively limited to the resources of this area. In the second place, and much more important, techniques, both mechanical and administrative, adapted to the economizing of resources were relatively undeveloped. Processes of substitution were carried nowhere near so far as in World War II. Furthermore, rationing of scarce commodities and the effective use of a priorities system were measures that had scarcely begun to be developed. Consequently, the German military effort was reduced by shortages of various sorts, and lack of food contributed significantly to demoralization back of the line. The Germans learned much from this experience. Improvement in German administration of economic resources before and during World War II was at least as impressive as German developments in military technology, and probably had as important an influence on keeping Germany in the war. If the proper wartime objective of economic policy is the minimizing of economic limitations to military action, it can be said that in most respects German economic policy was admirably conceived.

As a result of its admitted achievements in World War I, the Allies, but particularly Britain, entered World War II with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absurdly exaggerated notions of the importance of economic warfare. Even after Germany had conquered the resources of the European continent, it was widely believed that if she could be denied the importation of such necessities as rubber, oil, ferro-alloys, and copper, shortages of these materials would seriously diminish the size of her military effort. A comparison of German resources with the requirements of the British and American armed forces was, of course, in large part responsible for the illusion. A civilian expert, acquainted with American military requirements for, say, oil, copper and nickel, can scarcely be blamed if on studying the quantities of these materials known to be available to Germany he concluded that the Germans were indeed in a bad way. The conclusion, however, was wrong and, as we have seen, it was wrong because it seriously underestimated the economies possible through substitution and the application of effective raw material controls. If these possibilities have a bearing on the proper estimation of our own raw material interest, so likewise do they have a bearing on intelligence estimates of enemy strength.

Despite what has been said, it is still a matter of some importance to deny the enemy access to raw materials. But its importance must be measured in terms of the relatively small increase in labor requirements he will thereby have to face. The larger the economic space possessed by the enemy and the more highly developed his technology and his methods of raw material controls, the less effective will be the traditional methods of economic warfare. To these traditional methods, however, there is now added the ever increasing effectiveness of air bombardment.

This is not the place to assess the relative importance of economic objectives (mainly air targets) as compared to military objectives in World War II. It will, perhaps, be admitted that the economic system of all countries subject to air bombardment stood up surprisingly well and continued to meet military requirements even when subjected to heavy air attack. Whether decisive results could have been achieved through bombardment of industrial installations if the weight of the attack had been increased, or whether these resources might better have been diverted to attack on the armed forces of the enemy,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will probably prove to be a subject of lively debate for some time to come.

Concerning the prospective importance of economic objectives, two divergent trends appear to be in operation. On the one hand, developments in military technology continue to enhance the importance of economic objectives. Not only are the possibilities of striking far behind the enemy's military frontier continually being widened through the development of air power, but the weapons of attack seem progressively to favor industrial installations rather than armed forces. On the other hand, the economic space available to belligerents may be increasing, and the technology and economic controls necessary to the flexible use of economic resources within that space are certainly improving. What the result of these two divergent trends may be with respect to the future importance of economic objectives, we are not yet in a position to say.

It is possible, however, that economic warfare which yielded large results in World War I and disappointing results in World War II may, in consequence of these developments, return to a position of first rate importance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ALEKSANDROV STORY

By PERCY E. CORBETT

IN the Autumn of 1946, Georgi Aleksandrov, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Moscow and Chief of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation in the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was one of Moscow's success stories. Only thirty-eight years old, he had already reached the top rung of the academic ladder. He was, besides, a key figure in that liaison of politics and science upon which the Soviet Government leans so heavily in mobilizing the creative energies of its population for the magnification of the State. In his post as Chief of Propaganda and Agitation for the Communist Party, Aleksandrov was responsible, under Andrei Zhdanov of the Politburo, for the fanatical indoctrination of party-workers and party-members and for spreading the gospel of Marx-Leninism through the broad masses of the people. He was an active member of the editorial board of *Bolshevik*, long a principal intellectual weapon of the party and government. When *Culture and Life* was inaugurated as special organ of Zhdanov's savage campaign to purge every branch of art and learning of elements not wholly imbued with aggressive Marx-Leninism, it was foreordained that Aleksandrov should be the moving spirit in the new publication. The Academy of Social Sciences, established in 1946 as the highest agency of political instruction, began its career under his leadership.

On November 30, 1946, Aleksandrov attained the supreme scholarly prestige, the substantial income and perquisites, and the relative security, of membership in the Academy of Sciences.

This accumulation of honors and responsibilities had been well earned. Georgi Aleksandrov had worked. He was only twenty-eight when what party authorities regarded as important philosophical works began flowing from his pen. Three of these, published between 1936 and 1940, were devoted to the philosophy of Aristotle. The first expounded the *Natural-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philosophical Views of Aristotle; the second, the *Social-Political Views of Aristotle;* while the third was a monograph entitled *Aristotle*. Already there was no doubt that the budding politician-philosopher was able to make a virtue of the necessary and orthodox Marxist preference for Aristotle over Plato.

But Aleksandrov was anything but lost in the alluring antiquities of human thought. He could and did write effectively on current problems. His pamphlets and articles attacking fascism attracted special attention. In 1939, he was one of three editors of the *Political Dictionary*. Moreover, he soon had an important political job. Zhdanov, then Director of Propaganda for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, took him on as first assistant and deputy. In 1940 he assumed Zhdanov's place as Director, though the Central Committee's decree confirming the promotion explicitly kept Zhdanov in general control of this essential instrument of Soviet government.[1] The subordination to Zhdanov, as we shall see, was to manifest itself in various severe forms right up to the death of that portentous personage in 1948.

In 1942, Alexsandrov was awarded a Stalin prize for his scholarly works. This happened again in 1946, when his *History of Western European Philosophy* was published as a textbook for students in Soviet institutions of higher education. This book, as we shall see, was to be the focus of an elaborate discussion of the Soviet philosopher, his duty to party and State, and his place in world politics.[2] The interval between 1942 and 1946 was a period of strenuous aud successful activity, recognized by a rapid succession of distinctions. Clustered around medals "For the Defense of Moscow" and "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," Aleksandrov wore the insignia of the Orders of Lenin, The Red Flag of Labor and The Patriotic War. The diplomatic and press colony in Moscow knew him as one of the younger men with an unlimited future. Some of them rather liked him. His unflagging energy lacked the grim quality of Zhdanov's. He was even affable.

[1] Text of the decree in *Pravda*, September 7, 1940.

[2] It has been translated under the auspices of the Yale Institute of International Studies, and a limited number of copies of the translation is available there in photo-reproduction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There could hardly have been a greater moment in this exciting career than when, four days after his election to the Academy of Sciences, Aleksandrov addressed that august body on "Soviet Democracy." It was indeed the voice of the Politburo uttering in neatly arranged sequence, and from the highest scientific platform in the land, all the approved formulae about the perfections of the Soviet system—highest form of democracy thus far realized by man!—and the manifold and incurable vices of bourgeois parliamentary government. The speaker ranged all the way from a patronizing pity for the historians, political theorists and sociologists of the West, to whom the only true science of society, Marx-Leninism, had been denied, to scorn for the childish and venal slanders on Soviet life and institutions with which these pseudo-scientists try to earn their pay from their imperialist-capitalist employers.

For anyone who had been reading the articles and listening to the lectures of lesser fry in Moscow, there was unhappily nothing new either in the material of this paper or in its substitution of political declamation for dispassionate analysis on what might have seemed a scientific occasion. But it was deemed important enough to run for two successive days in *Pravda,* where its prominence was second only to that of a speech by Vishinsky at an American-Soviet friendship meeting in New York.[3]

Six months after this triumph, a conference of Soviet philosophers was convened in Moscow by Zhdanov, acting, he said, under specific instructions from Stalin. Eighty-three philosophers came with speeches, and forty-seven were able to deliver them, the others having to content themselves with subsequent publication. With Zhdanov himself participating, the proceedings amounted to a mass condemnation of Aleksandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy,* which, less than a year back, had been officially adopted as *the* textbook in its subject and glorified with a Stalin prize. Unless indeed the word had gone around to come and excoriate, the affair could only be regarded as one of those miraculously spontaneous and unified reversals of judgment which seem to occur nowhere but in the Soviet Union.

[3] *Pravda,* December 5 and 6, 1946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the trampling was all over, Aleksandrov rose meekly and recanted his many and grievous heresies. He was then not sent to Siberia, or even excommunicated, but commissioned to re-write his book in harmony with the 1948 demands of the Communist Party as expressed, with striking unanimity, by Zhdanov and the marshalled philosophers.

What is this book? What were the charges against it and its author? Why should Stalin and/or Zhdanov have thought it worth elaborate public repudiation? And what lessons about Soviet thought and procedure can we in the West learn from the whole business?

Aleksandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy* is a summary of the principal teachings of philosophers from the early Greeks to the middle of the nineteenth century, with a running commentary from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. At all points prominence is given to judgments by any of these supreme four on the merits of a given system or philosopher. As was to be expected, major attention is paid to the rise of the Marxist doctrines. Nothing is said of any post-Marxist thinkers other than Lenin and Stalin. For the Soviet student, apparently, the philosophy of Western Europe completed its work with the production of Marx and Engels, and has nothing further to offer.

The book has no literary charm. It would have been obvious, even if the author had not said so in his preface, that its text is a series of lecture-notes. But so far as it goes, it represents an honest attempt to inform Soviet students of the thought of Western philosophers on man and the universe. There is occasional misunderstanding, but no clear evidence of conscious distortion. Though all pre-Marxian schools of philosophy are finally evaluated in terms of their contribution of hints and fragments which assisted in the formulation of the materialist dialectic, the author is frequently generous in his recognition of merit. The student is indeed urged to condemn idealistic or religious explanations of physical or social phenomena, and constantly reminded of the unvarying perfection of dialectical materialism. Nevertheless, there is a tone of objectivity in the initial presentation of the doctrines of various philosophers which is totally lacking in the long lecture on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Democracy before the Academy of Sciences. Aleksandrov perhaps thought this safe in a philosophical text-book which refers in large part to a remote past and which even then pays the essential periodic tribute to the crowning genius of Lenin and Stalin. He was mistaken. Objectivity is a bourgeois illusion, not to be indulged in by Bolsheviks, whatever their eminence in science or philosophy.

Aleksandrov surely knew this. The principle is clearly set out in the very introduction of the book which had brought him first honor and then humiliation. Here it is:

> The history of philosophy shows that no philosophical system, even the most abstract, has ever stood apart from the social practice of its time. In the final analysis the philosopher, filling a defined role in the social movement, also strives with his own means for the general victory of the party and class which he represents. . . . The party and class character of every philosophy is manifested in a thousand ways.[4]

Aleksandrov's mistake was to let any suggestion of tolerance creep into his text. But we shall return to this when we examine the voluminous indictment.

In September, 1946, a Western student who had the good luck to pick up a copy of *The History of Western European Philosophy* (like so many books in Russia, it was bought out within a few days of its appearance) was apt to think that he had found the key to many things. Here was a book written by a man occupying a high party post, second only to Zhdanov in the drive to pick up the wartime slack in the machinery and practice of indoctrination and to ensure that every product of intellectual work in the U. S. S. R. carry its message of approved Soviet ideology. True, the author had a part in the more general *History of Philosophy* being brought out *seriatim* by the Academy of Sciences. He was indeed one of those responsible for the third volume, published in 1943, and sharply criticised in the *Bolshevik* of April, 1944, for its faulty treatment of the German philosophers, in particular for its failure to distinguish, as Lenin and Stalin had done, between the virtues of Hegel's dialectical method and the vices of his reactionary views of society. But that criticism had done nothing

[4] *Istoriya Zapadno-Ebropeiskoi Filosofii*, pp. 11 and 13. The reference, like those following, is to the Russian text, and the translation is mine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to retard Aleksandrov's success. His present position, the Stalin prize, and the adoption of his work as a text-book by the Ministry of Higher Education, were three convincing titles to authority. Combined, they made this manual the equivalent of an official statement by party and government of the position to be taken by all good Bolsheviks on the fundamental questions that had exercised the minds of European philosophers from Socrates to Marx. Merely to have a professional Russian philosopher, who was at the same time eminent in the Communist Party, bringing together and interpreting the scattered answers of Lenin and Stalin to these questions seemed an event of major importance.

Among other things, the reader might learn here what part the underlying doctrine of Marx and Lenin continued to play in actual policy. Would the book show any acknowledged amendments in the credo, designed to accommodate wartime collaboration with capitalist states or promise a measure of tolerance of non-Soviet ideologies? Would it show any sign that Stalin's assurances of co-existence and co-operation corresponded to a change in the theory of relations between Socialist and Capitalist societies, or were anything more than soothing noises made to quiet a world whose anxieties were becoming dangerous to Soviet plans?

As for the continuing importance attached by Soviet leaders to every detail of the Marx-Leninist doctrine, Aleksandrov does his best to impress this on his readers. Four quotations will serve both to state the thesis of the book, and the way in which that thesis is declared to be interwoven with policy:

> Only the materialist conception of history enables us accurately to discern the role of this or that philosophical system in the development of culture and to explain the part—revolutionary, progressive or conservative—that it plays in social development. History clearly shows that the progressive or conservative influence of a philosophy in the development of culture depends in the final analysis on what class or party is formulating its vital problems in that philosophy and what stage of development the class or party has reached. . . . Historical materialism views philosophical development and the conflict of different philosophical schools as a reflection of the struggle of social classes. . . . The Marx-Leninist history of philosophy studies the history of knowledge in its *necessary* development, in the struggle of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two fundamental currents in philosophy—*materialism* and *idealism*. . . . A philosophy is *materialistic* if it makes matter or nature primary, and mind secondary, derivative from and dependent on matter; *idealistic* if it makes mind primary and matter or nature secondary, derivative from and dependent on mind.[5]

The link between science and practical activity, between theory and practice—their unity—must be the guiding star of the party of the working class. Comrade Stalin writes that "Marxism is not only a theory of socialism but a whole world-view, a philosophical system from which flows directly the proletarian socialism of Marx. This philosophical system is called dialectical materialism."[6]

Comrade Stalin in his classical work, *On Dialectical and Historical Materialism,* has shown that scientific knowledge of the laws of historical development, the correct, dialectical method of studying those laws and the materialistic interpretation of them, convince us of the inevitability of the victory of new over old. There he reveals, convincingly and profoundly, the actual historical connection between the philosophy of the Bolshevik party and the structure of the new life in the Soviet Union.

The immense significance of extending the propositions of dialectical materialism into the field of social phenomena is clear. Comrade Stalin has shown the outstanding importance of applying the Marxist dialectic and Marxist philosophical materialism to the history of society and the practical activity of the party of the working class.[7]

The dialectic in the works of Lenin and Stalin is not merely a philosophical doctrine: it has been transformed into a formidable, effective weapon, opening the way to victory over all reaction and generating an inflexible faith in the triumph of progress.

The party of the working class, armed with a consistently scientific world-view, sees through all the detours and contingencies of history the underlying tendency of development and the guiding line of struggle. That is why events have never caught our party off guard.

Guided in its work by the philosophical science elaborated by Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, our party in the years of the Soviet Union's peaceful development achieved the most notable historical results. The successful socialist reformation of all departments of community life, the transformation of the U.S.S.R. into a mighty industrial-agricultural power was the best proof of the profound rightness of the theory of the Bolshevik party. The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascist aggressors has demonstrated anew that the road by which our people has travelled and is travelling under the leadership of its party is the right road.[8]

[5] Aleksandrov, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 478-79, quoting from *The Collected Works of Stalin*, Vol. I, p. 297.
[7] Aleksandrov, *op. cit.*, p. 479. [8] Aleksandrov, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These passages display a stark single-mindedness which is characteristic of the whole book. Nowhere does the reader find so much as a suggestion that any outlook other than that of dialectical materialism, or any mode of life other than Soviet socialism, may be good in itself. If other systems have had merits, these consisted solely in the fact that they were advances towards the one perfect system. The materialist dialectic of Marx, Lenin and Stalin emerges as the sole possible adult view of the world and program of social action.

There is no sign here of any advance towards a "live and let live" attitude. Such an attitude would still be total heresy; and heresy in a society which tolerates only one philosophy is indistinguishable from treason. There is no promise here of real peace, for no relation but conflict can exist between this and other systems. Co-operation with societies adhering to a different philosophy can only be a temporary, tactical measure, preserving or magnifying the strength of Soviet society. Permanent tolerance, to say nothing of permanent collaboration, would constitute a drastic departure from the system.

Of course the social and political theory may continue to be stated in all its repellent purity, while practice allows itself a margin of variation. The Soviet Government has found it expedient to make a great many departures from the Communist program with which the Revolution began. Nor are these by any means confined to such brief divergencies as the New Economic Policy of the twenties. The substitution of "to each according to his work" for "to each according to his need," the retention and vast differentiation of money-wages as an incentive to labor and skill, the expanded trading-powers of the co-operatives, the permitted accumulation of personal property and its transmission by will or intestate succession—all these features of the Soviet economy are a reversion to methods used also in capitalist societies. The one essential difference left is indeed the collective ownership of the means of production. Lapses from the original revolutionary program are justified as necessary adaptations to the fact that the stage of organization reached in the Soviet Union is not communism, the ultimate and perfect structure of society, but only the next lower stage, namely socialism. But it is not only the outside observer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who sees reason to believe that these devices of management are consolidating themselves as permanent institutions. Again, the tolerance of religion, and the recent reforms in family laws, involving the active and compulsory intervention of the State in marriage and divorce and the enforcement of parental support and discipline, look more like confessions of error than temporary expedients. As for the "withering away of the state," even after the achievement of communism, that fine formula has undergone a process of interpretation that robs it of any substantial promise.

The survival and expansion in the Soviet system of bourgeois methods of meeting economic and social problems, together with the growth of socialist elements in the economies of the parliamentary democracies, suggest a gradual and objective reintegration of these theoretically opposed ways of life. Consciousness of such a tendency partially explains the virulence of the Soviet propaganda which magnifies the difference (as one between heaven and hell) marking off the Soviet order from all others. The whole appeal to the people has been based upon the universal newness of Soviet methods. As the differences diminish, the leadership must intensify its insistence that they are still there.

The common belief that our conflict with the Soviet Union is not one with an animated doctrine, but the old familiar struggle with a group of men intent on personal power, does not quite dispose of the doctrine. For one thing, it leaves unanswered the question how far adherence to the doctrine is necessary to the retention of power. When a creed has been, and continues to be, hammered in as insistently as that of Marx-Leninism in the U. S. S. R., even the most cynical opportunists may become imprisoned in it. The qualifications in the earlier gospel noted above, it is worth observing, touch only internal matters. The swift retreat from the strictly controlled collaboration of wartime, and the sharp intensification of propaganda against the policies, institutions and leaders of the Western democracies, indicate that the central theme of *struggle* with social orders outside the Soviet orbit has not been modified. This in spite of Mr. Stalin's comforting interviews with journalists and politicians from the West. On the con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trary, this theme is emphasized by all the formidable resources of the propaganda machine. To offset favorable impressions gained by many Soviet citizens from their service even in the shattered countries of Europe, from their use of American machines and supplies, and from their wartime contact with foreigners, a program of systematic distortion and vilification has been thought necessary. This is designed to keep the Soviet citizen both afraid of war and laboring to make the Union strong for that event, and at the same time to neutralize unfavorable comparisons between his lot and that of workers in the Western democracies. There is no reason to believe that the Russian leaders want a shooting war. They clearly do want to maintain the sense and the reality of *struggle*. But struggle assumes many forms and many degrees of intensity. For the moment, though the intensity is of the highest, the battle is political and economic.

Now, to the Western reader, Aleksandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy* seems in basic harmony with the renewed Soviet onslaught upon us and our institutions. There is a certain dignity in its intolerance which marks it off from the vulgar abuse of press and platform; but there can be no mistake about the unbending, dogmatic hostility of the book. It is therefore easy to understand why journalists and other observers, mystified by the inquisition of June, 1947, looked for hidden reasons. Zhdanov was represented as having staged the whole affair in order to get rid of his Director of Propaganda and thus to score off Malenkov, his alleged rival for power in the Politburo. Aleksandrov, so the story ran, is a Malenkov man, and Zhdanov planned to replace him with Mikhail Suslov, a trusted protegé of his own.

Motives of this sort doubtless explain the rise and fall of some fortunes in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere. Nor would a ten-day conference of eighty-three philosophers be totally out of character in the Soviet Union as a procedure of removal. Even Zhdanov's public announcement that Stalin himself had commanded the exposure of Aleksandrov's errors[9] is not conclusive evidence that the proceedings were essentially anything more than an incident of a personal feud in the Politburo.

[9] *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1947, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But whether the affair had its origin in a power-struggle or in a genuine conviction that the book was spreading dangerous heresy, one thing at least is clear. The form of the attack, the nature and substance of the charges, have their own distinct significance. The episode was built up into a high-power drive in the campaign of party and government to dominate and use every form of intellectual activity in the Soviet Union. It also served as an occasion to reassert the inevitable hostility of the Soviet order to all other orders.

In his characteristically fighting speech to the conference, Zhdanov accused the philosophers of not having come to heel. Musicians, journalists, dramatists, novelists had bowed to the rod of the Central Committee, and with a great show of enthusiasm had repudiated the "bourgeois nonsense" of "art for art's sake." All must serve the aims of party and government. Very typical was the letter addressed to Stalin by the teachers and directors of institutions of higher education in the Moscow area and published in *Pravda* on October 24, 1946. These intellectuals promise never to forget that "all science is party science, and that its teaching cannot be divorced from the policy of the party, which is the living foundation of the Soviet state structure . . . Every day the student will be nurtured in Bolshevist thought." Then follows a salutation to Stalin, "our wise leader and teacher, greatest scholar of our epoch."

The time had now come for the philosophers, widest-ranging of intellectual workers, to make their collective obeisance. They did so by trampling, one after the other, on the work of a colleague marked out by the government for castigation.

Many of the vices found in the *History of Western European Philosophy* could be summed up in its alleged failure to carry through to its logical conclusion the principle that philosophy is inescapably partisan in character. It adopts an "objective" approach to the elucidation and evaluation of different systems. These are often described without reference to their historical environment. The class roots of philosophic theories are not revealed.

The author is also charged with not recognizing the sharply revolutionary character of Marxism. By his account, so the indictment runs, the Marx-Leninist dialectic might be a merely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evolutionary development of the Western European philosophic inheritance. It should have been presented as something miraculously new. Failing to reveal this essential feature of the Soviet ideology, Aleksandrov shows a respect for bourgeois theories which is entirely out of keeping with his duty as a Soviet intellectual. Here we reach the climax—He kow-tows to the West!

In the current language of Soviet propaganda, kow-towing to the West means simply failure to show a burning and constant hostility to everything connected with the parliamentary democracies. Philosophers too must think and must teach in these aggressive terms. "The philosophic front," says Zhdanov, has been soft. The workers there

> must hasten to make up for lost time. Their tasks will not wait. The brilliant victory won by socialism in The Great Patriotic War, which was also a brilliant victory for Marxism, was like a bone stuck in the throat of the imperialists. The center of the fight against Marxism has shifted now to America and England. All the forces of obscurantism and reaction have rallied to the struggle. The tools of atom-dollar democracy have been brought out of hiding and taken into the service of bourgeois philosophy, the worn accoutrements of superstition and popery, the Vatican and the racist theory, foolish nationalism and obsolete idealistic philosophy, the venal yellow press and corrupt bourgeois art. But still they aren't strong enough. Under the banner of the ideological war with Marxism the last reserves are now being recruited. Gangsters, pimps, spies, ordinary criminals are taken into the ranks.[10]

Andrei Zhdanov's gift for baroque invective was by no means unique. It is the normal equipment of the Soviet polemicist. Also normal in the Soviet Union, even apparently for a meeting of philosophers, is the report (in parenthesis) of "prolonged and thunderous applause," greeting his tirade. What is interesting, for the light it throws on the Aleksandrov story and on the prospect of collaboration with the Soviet regime, is the summons to Soviet philosophers to take the brunt of the alleged assault and lead the counter-attack. Upon them devolves the duty to arm not only their own people but the "new democracies" with the intellectual weapons of Marxism, and to deal

[10] *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1947, pp. 21-22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the death-blow to the "corrupt and abominable bourgeois ideology."[11]

The tone and scope of the proceedings make it abundantly clear that Zhdanov had more in mind than the satisfaction of a private grudge. It would have been better for the world if only that had been involved. What the episode demonstrates is the utter thoroughness of the Soviet mobilization for intellectual domination. What has been done to the geneticists, dramatists, writers, musicians and economists, is to be done also to those thinkers whose work synthesizes all the arts and sciences.

Andrei Zhdanov is dead. Aleksandrov, so far as we know, is alive and active. True, he was replaced before the end of 1947 by Mikhail Suslov in his post as Chief of Propaganda. Zhdanov, apart from any personal objections, may have decided that he was not tough enough for the job. But in the September 15, 1948 number of *Bolshevik* he is still listed as a member of the editorial board, and in the *New Times* of October 27, 1948, he has a vigorous attack on Bertrand Russell. The March 1948 number of the *Vestnik* of the Academy of Sciences shows him presenting a report on plans to reorganize the Institute of Philosophy and the whole conduct of philosophical instruction in the Soviet Union, on lines to satisfy the new demands of the party. At this meeting, too, Zhdanov still pursued him. There was an unflagging, fanatical quality in that man's zeal which must be missed even in a government of zealots. There is, however, no sign yet that his death has removed any of the vitriol from Soviet propaganda or in any way abated the total regimentation of Soviet minds.

The Aleksandrov story is not ended. There may be exciting chapters to it yet. The survival and continuing activity of the central character is another indication, alongside the current controversy over Varga and his economics,[12] that unsparing criticism even from the highest quarter does not for the moment necessarily mean execution or exile for the prominent Soviet

[11] *Ibid.* The quotations are from Zhdanov's speech to the conference of philosophers.

[12] See Frederick C. Barghoorn. "The Varga Discussion and Its Significance," in *The American Slavic and East European Review,* Vol. VII, No. 3, October, 1948.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

citizen. In the West, we shall eagerly await any sign that the process may be reversed without fatal consequences to the critic.

Zhdanov, in his speech to the philosophers, made much of a cliché which probably does more for the intellectual consistency of dialectical materialism than for the security of those who follow the formula too literally. It runs as follows: "For growth there must be conflict, but in the country of the Soviets, criticism and self-criticism have been substituted for the conflict of the classes."[13] Every reader of *Pravda* or *Izvestiya* finds plenty of unsparing criticism of faulty details of administration. There, as in speeches in the Supreme Soviet, the strictures may be aimed even at a department of Government. How completely these attacks are inspired and directed is a matter for speculation. Obviously the formula does not mean a general liberty of spontaneous criticism of high policy and high personages. The conference of philosophers itself clearly showed that the criticism must not touch the basic principles of Marx-Leninism or suggest merits in any opposing doctrine. The fact that eminent scholars may err in the eyes of the Politburo without being exterminated is indeed encouraging. But with the memory of the jurist Pashukanis and the geneticist Vavilov fresh in their minds, observers will be slow to conclude that 'criticism and self-criticism,' while they may be a fine dialectical substitute for the class-struggle, have yet been substituted for the purge.

[13] *Bolshevik*, No. 16, August 30, 1947, p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATESMANSHIP AND MORAL CHOICE

By ARNOLD WOLFERS

THROUGHOUT the ages moralists have expressed horror at the way princes and sovereign states behave toward each other. Behavior which would be considered immoral by any standard can obviously be detected in all realms of life; but nowhere does the contradiction between professed ethical principles and actual behavior appear so patent and universal as in the conduct of foreign relations. Governments spy on each other and lie to each other; they violate pledges and conduct wars, often at the cost of millions of lives and untold misery. No wonder, then, that in western democracies if not elsewhere indignation over such practices should be voiced with vehemence. In our day it frequently expresses itself in wholesale denunciations of the multi-state system on the ground that sovereign states cannot deal with each other except by the use of immoral means, derogatorily called power politics. Some draw the cynical conclusion that morality has no place in international politics, while others would have men fulfill their moral duty by substituting world government for the present immoral political system.

This sweeping moral condemnation of foreign policy as pursued by all nations points to a striking and disturbing contradiction in our public life. Most of our statesmen claim to be pursuing policies of peace and enunciate high moral principles upon which their policy is supposed to be based; they and many publicists praise the democracies for the moral superiority of their conduct of foreign affairs over that of aggressive and ruthless dictators. Yet at the same time many respected students in the field of international relations insist that all sovereign states alike are compelled by the "system" to play the evil game of power politics. The two positions would seem to be incompatible. Either our statesmen and their supporters are deceiving themselves and others or those who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without discrimination condemn all power politics as immoral are overstating the case. In a country like the United States where moral passion tends to run high and where the question of morality in politics is a matter of genuine and wide concern, it is important to try to resolve this contradiction.

The idea that power politics are beyond the pale of morality is not new. Down through the centuries Machiavelli and Machiavellianism have stood for a doctrine which places princes and sovereign states under the rule not of ordinary morality but of the "reason of state," considered an amoral principle peculiar to the realm of politics.[1] German writers have been particularly insistent that ethical standards which apply to private individuals cannot measure the behavior of states which are said to be guided by necessity if not by a *höhere Sittlichkeit*.[2]

The English-speaking world, not seldom accused of comfortably ignoring or hypocritically denying the contradictions between ethics and international politics, has been unwilling on the whole to admit of any peculiar ethics of state behavior. Because states are abstractions, or at best fictitious personalities, it is not the state that decides and acts but always individuals, though they be statesmen. Should their behavior be judged differently from that of other individuals merely because they act for the state? To answer in the affirmative would mean accepting the hardly more palatable idea of a double standard of morality, according to which individuals when acting for themselves shall follow one set of moral principles while the same individuals when conducting their nation's

[1] One might question whether Machiavelli meant to draw a sharp distinction between the ethics of state behavior, the behavior of "princes," which was his main concern, and the ethics of individual behavior. In the same Chapter XV of *The Prince*, in which he advises the sovereign to learn "how not to be good," he also speaks generally of the condition of man, saying that "whoever abandons what is done for what ought to be done will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation." He goes on to say that such a man "must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good."

[2] Friedrich Meinecke's *Die Idee der Staatsräson*, Munich and Berlin, 1925, is a classic study of the relations between ethics and power politics as seen by Machiavelli and his continental disciples down to Treitschke. No similar study has been written on the views of their Anglo-Saxon contemporaries, though Gerhard Ritter, in *Machtstaat und Utopie*, Munich and Berlin, 1914, makes a suggestive beginning to such a study. He contrasts Machiavelli, "pioneer of the continental power state," with Thomas More, "ideological father of the English insular welfare state"—the former setting power above morality (p. 31), the latter seeking the "Ethisierung und Entdämonisierung der Macht" (p. 89).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign policy shall be bound by another and presumably less stringent code of behavior.[3]

At first sight the facts seem to bear this out. Do we not condemn and punish citizens for committing the very acts of violence, treaty violation or untruthfulness which we condone in international politics? Are we not constantly struck by the gulf that separates the relatively peaceful and humane life within the national borders of states from the events occurring on the international scene? It is this contrast—more apparent than true, as we shall see—that has led some to demand that statesmen be made to give up their sinful ways and to conform to the rules of behavior expected from individuals in an orderly community. Unfortunately, advice of this kind often proves so patently impractical that instead of inducing statesmen to mend their ways it provokes in them a sense of moral cynicism. What is the use of listening to moral advice, they ask, if statesmanship, capable of mastering the problems which present themselves in practice, is apparently incompatible with morality?

The fundamental discrepancy which seems to exist between the morality of "state" and private behavior would disappear only if it could be shown that politics conducted in a multistate system is not necessarily any more immoral than average private behavior, or that the chief difference pertains not to the degree of immorality prevailing in the two spheres of human action but to the circumstances under which men are required to act. Much of what strikes people as immoral practices of governments may prove to be morally justified by the peculiar and unhappy circumstances which the statesman has to face and which, moreover, he may often be unable to change.

Any ethical perfectionist will be shocked at such a suggestion. He will deny that any action that would be evil under one

[3] While Hans J. Morgenthau in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946, declares that "No civilization can be satisfied with . . . a dual morality" (p. 179), William Ernest Hocking, *The Spirit of World Politics*, New York, Macmillan, 1932, writes that statesmen distrust public opinion in international affairs because the public "takes for granted that the codes (for individuals and for states) are the same." E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, London, Macmillan, 1940, in contrast to these authors asserts that most people, while believing that states ought to act morally, do not expect of them the same kind of moral behavior which they expect of themselves and of one another (p. 199).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

set of conditions could be morally justified under another. If men are held to be morally bound to act in accordance with an absolute ethic of love such as the Sermon on the Mount, obviously no set of circumstances, even circumstances in which the survival of a nation were at stake, could justify acts such as a resort to violence, untruthfulness, or treaty violation. The concern for self-preservation and power in itself would have to be condemned as evil. This being the case, the ethical perfectionist can offer no advice to statesmen other than that they give up public office and turn their backs on politics. As a matter of fact, in order to be consistent, the perfectionist, as some have pointed out, must give the same advice to private citizens, requiring of them that they abandon their concern for their own welfare, for family or business. If, as Hans Morgenthau holds, "the very act of acting destroys our moral integrity," only a life of saintliness could come close to satisfying perfectionist moral commands.[4]

We must address ourselves exclusively then to the non-perfectionist who demands of man, not that he follow an absolute code of ethical rules—what Max Weber calls the "natural law of absolute imperatives"—but that he make the best moral choice which the circumstances permit.[5]

But surely, it will be objected, no moralist, at least in our culture, could deviate so far from perfectionist standards as to condone even in wartime such inhuman practices as the torture of enemy soldiers or the shooting of hostages. One would wish that this objection would always be valid, but the fact is that the non-perfectionist cannot escape the conclusion that circumstances may justify what superficially appear to be the most despicable kinds of human conduct. Or would he condemn without careful prior investigation all the members of the French Resistance movement who, in the face of brutal Nazi tactics, are said to have answered their enemy in kind? What if they were unable to discover any other alternatives but either to stop in this repulsive fashion the horrors com-

[4] Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

[5] See Max Weber's "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 120 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mitted by the Nazis or else to leave their friends and their cause unprotected? This does not imply that circumstances morally justify every act of power politics from the violation of the pledged word to aggression and concentration camps; the chances are that in most instances they will not, whether because the cause is unworthy of such extreme sacrifices or because other means are available which will assure morally preferable over-all results. Nor does it mean that where circumstances do justify such acts men may not be guilty of having brought about these circumstances or of having failed to remove them.

There is nothing peculiar to international politics in this impact of circumstance. Our conscience revolts at the idea of men putting other men to death. Yet non-perfectionist moralists throughout the western world agree in condoning the acts of those who kill in self-defense, in obedience to an order to execute a criminal, in war, or possibly in the case of tyrannicide. In other cultures it has been considered morally proper, if not a moral duty, to put the first born, aging parents, or widows to death. One and the same act, then, will be judged differently depending on the context within which it is performed and depending also, of course, on the ethical standards by which behavior in general is judged.

This is not the place to enter upon the age-old discussion of what the standards of a non-perfectionist ethic should be, nor is such a discussion necessary for our purpose. However much non-perfectionists may disagree on ethical standards and thus on the nature and hierarchy of values, they hold in common the process by which they reach their moral judgments. They start with the conviction that there can be no escape from sacrifices of value whether, as theologians maintain, because of man's original sin and essential corruption, or because of the dilemmas of a world in which man is faced with incompatible moral claims. With this as a basis they hold that men, statesmen and private individuals alike, are morally required to choose among the roads open to them the one which under the circumstances promises to produce the least over-all de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struction of value or, positively speaking, points toward the maximization of value.[6]

Moral condemnation, according to non-perfectionist ethics, rests not on the fact that values have been destroyed, however deplorable or downright evil such destruction may be judged. Instead it is based on the conviction either that the action in question rested on false ethical standards or that in terms of agreed ethical standards a less destructive choice could and should have been made.[7]

Thus a private citizen who breaks family ties in order to serve what he considers a higher cause may find himself condemned because his cause is not considered worth the sacrifice or because there were other less costly ways of attaining his end. Similarly a statesman who decides to break off diplomatic negotiations rather than to accept the terms of the opposing side may be judged wrong because he placed undue value on an increment of national prestige which was at stake or because he failed to appreciate properly the dangers involved in his choice of action. There is no difference either in the method of evaluation or in the ethical standards, whether the case be one of political or private behavior. In that sense the ethic of politics is but a part of general ethics. The question which remains to be answered, however, is why the sacrifices of value in international politics should be as widespread, continuous, and shocking in extent as they so obviously are. Is it because the circumstances under which foreign policy is conducted are so

[6] Max Weber's "ethic of responsibility," (*op. cit.*, pp. 118 ff.) comes closer to what is here described as a non-perfectionist ethic of maximization of value than it might appear from some of his statements. Weber, it is true, declares that "from no ethics in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose 'justifies' the ethically dangerous means and ramification" (p. 121). He is here taking issue with the revolutionary fanatic who from the point of view of an "ethic of ultimate ends" considers every act of violence justified so long as it serves his ultimate end. But when Weber goes on to demand of men that they hold themselves responsible for the consequences of their acts, especially their acts of violence, he does not refute their moral right to "contract with the diabolic powers of violence" which as political men they must do, but implicitly calls on them to choose the road which will minimize the evil consequences for which they bear responsibility.

[7] Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, following in the footsteps of Max Weber, also emphasizes the "ethical paradoxes" of politics. "Political ethics," he says, "is indeed the ethics of doing evil" (p. 202). Yet he too concludes that "it is moral judgment," meaning presumably the best a man can morally do "to choose among several expedient actions the least evil one" (p. 203).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

different and so unalterably different from those under which private citizens make their choices?

German writers on international politics have emphasized what they consider a unique and all-pervasive circumstance characteristic of inter-state relations. Writing in the heyday of German *Realpolitik* Ratzenhofer declared categorically that the relations between sovereign states are unalterably relations of enmity.[8] His assertion reminds one of the no less dogmatic Marxist proposition according to which the relations between capital and labor in a capitalist economy are relations of enemies engaged in a class war.[9]

If one looks at the facts of history and of the contemporary world, one cannot subscribe to this German view. Instead it seems as if the relations between sovereign states no less than the relations between other groups or individuals run the whole gamut from almost complete amity—take Canadian-American or Anglo-Canadian relations—to almost unmitigated enmity, as in the days of war. Amity and enmity appear as the two extreme poles of a wide scale of human relationships. It remains true, however, and a matter of great political and moral consequence, that the multi-state system, for reasons which cannot be analyzed here, has a tendency to push relations between at least some states in the direction of enmity—and, for that matter, more so in our century than in the last. The Nazis certainly saw to it that this would be so. As faithful disciples of Gustav Ratzenhofer, Carl Schmitt and others, they not only believed in the inevitability of international enmity but true to their theoretical assumption conducted German policy in such a way as to arouse the fiercest kind of enmity in most parts of the world.

The concepts of amity and enmity can be usefully employed to shed light on the context within which statesmen are forced to make their choices. They stand for the two opposite and

[8] See Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, Leipzig, 1893.

[9] Carl Schmitt, in *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Munich, 1932, modifies Ratzenhofer's thesis by declaring that inter-state and, in fact, all truly political relations are in the nature of "friend-foe" relations. While he does not claim that relations between all states at all times are inevitably hostile, he maintains that nations always group themselves as friends and foes and that, there could be no such thing as statehood or politics if it were not for the existence of potential enmity, by which he means the possibility of deadly physical combat.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marginal extremes of human relationships. Behavior changes as the relationship approximates one or the other of these poles. The causes of enmity in inter-state relations are significant to the moral problem only to the extent to which statesmen may be responsible for bringing about or for not eliminating enmity, and thus become responsible for the consequences of such enmity.

One can imagine a condition of complete enmity between states. There would be no trace of community between them, no sense of commonly held values or of common interest. Each individual state would have to be looked upon as an entirely separate entity operating in the social vacuum of absolute anarchy. There would exist a state of latent if not actual war all the time, turning diplomacy into warfare with other means. With good reason nations could consider themselves in a constant state of emergency with all the things gravely endangered to which they attached value. It would be a situation, as we know it from the experience of total war, in which the sheer quest for survival would justify almost any course of action. "Out-group morality" of the most extreme type would prevail.

Take the other extreme, that of amity or the "friend-to-friend" relationship. While there would be no complete identification, a sense of community would exist sufficient to eliminate mutual fear and suspicion. There would be no expectation of violence and therefore no need for preparations with which to meet the dangers of conflict. Despite the fact that each state would be sovereign, or rather because each state would be free to handle its own affairs, such friendly nations could behave toward each other according to the codes of "in-group morality" and live in peace with each other.

The more relations between states degenerate toward enmity the more nations are justified in fearing for the things they cherish and the more reason they have to make and require sacrifices by which inimical claims can be defeated. Greater enmity therefore increases the likelihood that Machiavellian practices will become necessary and morally justified. The degree of amity or enmity thus appears as a morally portentous circumstance. While in a state of amity statemen are likely to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be able to choose between different avenues toward cooperation, compromise and conciliation. Enmity, however, may preclude such choices and place before the statesman a different set of alternatives. He may be able to take steps which will promise to mitigate if not to eliminate existing enmity. Often, however, he will have to choose between efforts to deter his opponent, thereby neutralizing the effects of enmity, and efforts to defeat him.

This cannot be said to be a peculiarity of international politics or of the multi-state system. The same phenomenon can be found in the relationship between father and son, employer and employee, white and colored man. There may be complete amity between them with no trace of distrust, no shadow of fear, no concern for self-protection, no awareness of conflicting demands or expectations. But here, too, relations may degenerate into fierce hostility for reasons too numerous to detail. Behavior then may change beyond recognition.

Two friends may live in almost perfect harmony. But let suspicion arise that one is seeking to exploit their hitherto harmonious relationship in some treacherous fashion. The other will feel justified in spying on his onetime friend. He may start laying traps. The case may end with one man killing the other. What is important to remember in this connection is that the killer may be judged to have been neither legally nor morally guilty, provided the treachery was flagrant enough. Not only our courts but public opinion in our country recognize the excuses of self-defense and unbearable provocation.

Similarly, strife between such groups as industrialists and workers may lead to property damage, kidnapping, or even open violence. Here, again, moral judgment will take the circumstances into account. Public opinion has been aroused at times by the employment of industrial police in labor disputes and by acts of violence on the part of striking workers. In each case, however, condemnation on the part of fair-minded judges of human behavior has been based not so much on the fact that the group in question used tactics of power politics as on the conviction that the provocation or grievances in a given instance were not sufficient to justify acts of coercion and violence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It will be objected, and rightly so, that intra-state relations are less likely than inter-state relations to reach a degree of hostility that would call for the use of violence and other Machiavellian devices.[10] The state protects many of the values to which people are attached. The state can also prohibit the use of means to which society is opposed and can enforce its prohibition—though only by the very means which the components of that society have renounced for themselves. This holds true, however, only for well organized states where the government can marshal sufficient authority and police power to prevent family feuds and social or racial conflicts from breaking into the open and degenerating into violence and the use of other Machiavellian means. But while the pacifying influence of such a state and its influence on human behavior should not be minimized, exponents of world statehood tend to exaggerate the case for government.[11] The kind of government and therefore the kind of internal peace which this country enjoys at this time represents the exception rather than the rule. Our government operates under conditions, not wholly state-made, of widespread amity between most of the groups that are powerful enough to influence the course of domestic events. It is recognized as legitimate by practically everyone and is ordinarily obeyed not because it has the force of coercion but because its authority is freely accepted. If one looks at the performance of other governments either in the contemporary world or in past periods of history, one finds no lack of examples of governments operating under quite different conditions and with quite different results.

[10] Some writers while agreeing that the ethical problems of political and private life are basically the same nevertheless stress the difference, if only quantitative, which makes international power politics the domain of evil *par excellence*. In his earlier works Reinhold Niebuhr stresses the peculiar selfishness and immorality of human communities including the state, as indicated by the title of his book, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Later, however, he places more emphasis on the fact that all life is a "contest of power" and that international war and conflict are but a revelation of the general character of human existence and human sinfulness. (See his *Christianity and Power Politics*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940, especially pages 11, 12, and 103.)

[11] Mortimer Adler, *How To Think About War And Peace*, New York, Simon and Shuster, 1944, declares anarchy to be the only cause of war and defines anarchy as "the condition of those who try to live without government." (p. 69)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some governments are strong and ruthless enough to suppress the hostilities that would otherwise break out between warring factions, ethnic, social, or religious, but they do so by means of suppression, often tyrannical or terroristic. Rather than eliminate Machiavellian practices, such governments merely monopolize them. To what extremes of behavior this may lead has been drastically demonstrated by the way modern totalitarian regimes have persecuted the "enemies of the people." Other governments are too weak to control the forces of internal enmity; then there are bloody revolts or civil wars. When that happens enmity often reaches a degree of fierceness which relations between states rarely approximate. Machiavellian practices of the most extreme kind become the order of the day.

Government or statehood, whether national or world-wide, is therefore no panacea against those aspects of power politics which are morally deplorable. The real evil is enmity and its threat to values to which people are devoted.

However, the moralist needs to be reminded of the fact that there is not only no sure way to eliminate the fateful circumstance of enmity but that at a given time there may be no way at all. Certainly the elimination of the multi-state system itself, whether within a region such as Europe or on a world-wide scale is not one of the objectives statesmen are free to choose and therefore morally obliged to choose under all circumstances. Even if a radical change in the existing order were morally desirable because there was reason to suppose that a regional federation or a world government would create circumstances of greater amity than exist today, the psychological prerequisites for a concerted move of major nations toward such a goal are beyond the control of governments.

If it be true that statesmen cannot at all times choose to work for conditions of world-wide amity under world government, is it not their moral duty at least to promote amity at all times and at all costs? Once it is conceded that enmity requires and justifies sacrifices of value often of the most shocking kind, it would seem as if no price paid for amity could be considered too high. Yet statesmen would be rendered incapable of maxi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mizing value if, without respect for the context in which they were forced to operate in a given instance, the quest for amity were taken as the sole measure of their actions. Amity is a condition passionately to be desired; but there are times when efforts to bring it about will lead to disaster. It takes two to make friends. An attempt to establish bonds of friendship may be interpreted as a sign of weakness; the result may be aggression. Again the demands of the opponent may call for sacrifices of value greater than those connected with continued enmity. Firmness and even resort to force may under certain circumstances require less loss of life, less human suffering, less destruction of faith and principle than the most sincere attempt to eliminate the causes of hostility by concessions.

This is not the same as saying that power politics generally preclude the opportunity for persistent and active pursuit of amity—or of justice for that matter. There are many occasions when disputes can be settled peacefully and when enmity can be eliminated or avoided, provided one side at least has enough courage, imagination and initiative. Sometimes a spirit of conciliation or even of generosity can do wonders in evoking a ready and sincere response. Whenever the lines of enmity are not irreparably drawn, there may remain room for moderation and self-restraint, for better understanding of each other's true designs and for fair compromise. While it is true that in the end it needs two to make friends, it is not always the other side which must take the first step.[12]

Only those who extol the value of national "virility" which is supposed to express itself in obstinate resistance to compromise, or those who are afraid of being the suckers will insist that the "necessity of state" is always on the side of toughness and unrelenting assertion of national claims. Harold Nicolson castigates Napoleon for being able to ascribe Castlereagh's

[12] Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948, p. 320, testifies admirably to these opportunities for statesmanship. He says "those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign Power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting good will!"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"splendid moderation" only to treachery or corruption, to ignorance or folly.[13] Whether moderation is politically practical or suicidal depends on the circumstances. Those who feel called upon to give moral advice to statesmen must be ready, if they are to be true to the tenets of non-perfectionist ethics, to demand restraint of power, charity and forgiveness in one situation, as when feelings of revenge and war passions run high, but to insist on a break with an opponent, if not on the use of violence, when weakness or procrastination threaten to bring on greater evils. If world government were not only practical but would, if established, temper enmities and help nations protect or attain what they rightly value most highly, it would be the moral duty of statesmen to seek to bring it about. As things stand today, however, lack of consensus among the major nations about the desirability of world government as well as about the kind of world government they would accept is so obvious that any attempt to establish such a government today would be more likely to lead to war than to reduce enmity.

To the extent that enmity exists and cannot be eliminated at a given moment it would appear to dictate to the statesman a course of action that will often run counter to his moral preferences. Does this not mean that those exponents of *Realpolitik* are right who claim that the statesman, instead of being able to make moral choices, is left with virtually no leeway, having to bow to the dictates of the "necessity of state?"

It confuses the moral issue to state the case in this way. The "necessities" in international politics and for that matter in all spheres of life do not push decision and action beyond the realm of moral judgment; they rest on moral choice themselves. If a statesman decides that the dangers to the security of his country are so great that a course of action which may lead to war is necessary, he has placed an exceedingly high value on an increment of national security.

Necessities of a similar kind are known to private citizens. Parents may decide that in order to save the family business they must try to get their son to enter the family firm. Although they know that they are asking him to choose a career he abhors, they are ready to sacrifice his happiness to the "neces-

[13] Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna,* London, Constable, 1946, p. 236.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sity of family." A trade union leader who calls a strike which he knows to be ruinous to patrons to whom he is devoted makes and requires a painful sacrifice for the "necessities" of the labor movement. In every such case conflicting values, interests and loyalties call for choices in which what is deemed to be the higher cause or value calls for submission to its necessities.

It is no play on words to say that the necessity or reason of state is but another of these necessities of life which become compelling only as a particular pattern of values is accepted. If the position of the statesman differs from that of private citizens it is because he must take upon himself the responsibility for sacrifices of value in order that others, as a nation, may protect or attain the things which they treasure. He may feel in duty bound to do so even though in a given instance he may disagree with the moral judgment of those to whom he is responsible. In that sense if in no other it may be justifiable to speak of the peculiar "demonic" quality of politics and public office, as Max Weber and other writers frequently do.

There is good reason why the controversy about the relationship between necessity of state and ethical standards should be rife in our culture. It points to a clash between two sets of ethical standards, one Christian or humanistic, the other nationalistic. Nationalistic ethics place what are called vital national interests—and not national survival only—at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of values. The preservation or attainment of these values—territorial integrity, colonial possessions, *Lebensraum,* treaty rights or economic interests—are therefore assumed to justify the sacrifice of almost every other value whether it be life, generosity, humane treatment of others, truthfulness or obedience to the law. Especially, the interests of other nations count for little, if anything, on a nationalistic scale of values.

While those who adhere to non-perfectionist Christian or humanistic ethical views accept the fact that sacrifices of value are inescapable, as non-nationalists they may nevertheless, in the case of any policy decision, question whether a particular national interest is worth the sacrifices required or could not be protected by a less costly method. This may not seem to hold true when national survival itself is unquestionably at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stake. It could properly be said that the multi-state system, since it rests on the co-existence of a multitude of independent states, is incompatible with any ethic which would forbid sacrifices necessary for national survival. Moral advice not to submit to the necessities of survival would not only be advice to commit national suicide but would tend to wreck the multi-state system itself.[14]

As a matter of fact, the controversy between exponents of nationalistic and non-nationalistic ethical standards in our culture is not over the moral right to pay the price of survival. None but the perfectionists or absolute pacifists deny a nation which is engaged in a life and death struggle the right to make and demand every sacrifice necessary for victory.

But this is not the same as saying that the non-perfectionist must capitulate before every alleged "necessity of state." Nations engaged in international politics are faced with the problem of survival only on rare occasions. How otherwise could it be explained that most of the nations which have attained independence in recent centuries have survived when surely most of them most of the time have been devoted to anything but an unrestrained quest for power? If ever any country did employ Machiavellian principles consciously and methodically it was Hitler's Germany, but with the result that she lost her independence as conclusively as few great nations have done.

As a rule, not survival but other "national interests" are at stake, such as the preservation of outlying bases and possessions, the protection of treaty rights, the restoration of national

[14] It is not surprising that authors who believe that international politics is essentially a struggle for national survival should reach very pessimistic ethical conclusions. Thus, Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1942, bases his case on the proposition that "the struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival" and that states can survive only by constant devotion to power politics. Although the use of power "should be constantly subjected to moral judgments" (p. 12), Spykman concludes that the "statesman can concern himself with values of justice, fairness and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective," meaning the quest for survival. In his further statement that the quest for power is not made for "the achievement of moral values" he is taking issue with those exponents of nationalistic ethics who place supreme moral value on national survival. See also in this connection Mortimer Adler's statement that "so long as national self-preservation remains the dominant end for which prudence must choose means, the principles of morality cannot be reconciled with the counsels of prudence." (*op. cit.*, p. 78)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

honor, or the maintenance of economic advantages. While it is a prerequisite of the system that nations attach a high if not the highest value to their survival, the same cannot be said of these other national interests. As a matter of fact, the moral dilemmas with which statesmen and their critics are constantly faced revolve around the question of whether in a given instance the defense or satisfaction of interests other than survival justify the costs in other values. Does the expropriation of American investments abroad, for instance, justify the choice of military intervention rather than of unpromising negotiation? Is it morally preferable to risk a loss of prestige with its possible dangerous consequences for the safety of the country rather than to insist on maintaining a position which threatens to provoke hostilities? In every case the interpretation of what constitutes a vital national interest and how much value should be attached to it is a moral question. It cannot be answered by reference to alleged amoral necessities inherent in international politics; it rests on value judgments.

Even national survival itself, it should be added, is a morally compelling necessity only as long as people attach supreme value to it. In that sense the multi-state system itself depends on a value pattern in which there is an element of nationalism. If at any time those who have the power to decide over the foreign policies of the major countries should come to attach higher value to the attainment of world government than to the preservation of independence, the psychological, though not necessarily all other practical, obstacles to world government would be removed.[15] Until that happens nations are likely to consent to all kinds of Machiavellian practices, however much they may abhor them, whenever they are convinced that their independence can be saved in no other way.

[15] R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, New York, Macmillan, 1947, suggests that these basic value judgments may change as the old myths of national sovereignty and national interests lose their grip on people, while Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1947 (p. 299), passing moral judgment, denounces the "pagan worship of sovereign nation-states" calling it a monstrous product of the impact of parochialism on the Western Christian Church." See, in this connection, also Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York and London, McGraw-Hill, 1935, who devotes Chapter XI, "In Quest of a Myth: The Problem of World Unity," to the problem of how, by the use of symbols, myths, and other practices, human value judgments might be changed in favor of world unity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International politics offer some opportunities and temptations for immoral action on a vast and destructive scale; they tend to present themselves in the guise of "necessity of state." Statesmen in command of the machinery by which public opinion can be manipulated may make it appear as if they were acting for the sake of objectives to which the people attach high value when in fact they are out to serve material personal interests or to satisfy personal ambitions for power. Where men wield as much power as they do in international politics there is room for an infinite variety of abuses for which the "necessity of state" can serve as a convenient cloak. Then again, statesmen may sincerely believe that a particular course of action is dictated by vital national interests; but judged by non-nationalistic standards of ethics they may be placing undue value on certain interests of their people or underestimating the value of things not pertaining to their nation which their policy would sacrifice.

While this makes moral criticism and self-criticism imperative, the difficulties which stand in the way of their proper use in international politics need to be emphasized. If it is hard for statesmen to make proper moral choices, it is not any easier for others to do justice to their conduct of foreign policy.

It is a baffling task, almost exceeding human capacity, to compare the value of an increment of national security with the value of human lives, or the value of a continued period of peace with the risks of a more destructive war in the future. Yet the statesman is faced with even more exacting and truly terrifying problems. Forced to make his choices whenever a decision is called for, he may have to compare the value of an uncertain chance of greater security with only roughly predictable risks of conflict and destruction. It may be easy with hindsight, and years after the event, to condemn a statesman for having failed to maximize value; but it also becomes increasingly difficult as time goes on to do justice to the inevitable lack of knowledge and foresight under which the decision-maker labored at the time. Yalta is a good example to illustrate this moral problem.[16]

[16] See Rudolph A. Winnacker, "Yalta—Another Munich?" in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn, 1948), pp. 521-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The trouble about much of the moral condemnation of foreign policies and with much of the moral advice tendered to statesmen goes back to a lack of appreciation of the kind of knowledge required for proper and useful moral criticism in international affairs. From a non-perfectionist point of view the circumstances, however technical, have to be taken into consideration; moral conviction and high ideals, much as they are needed to guide moral judgment, cannot by themselves offer an answer. Nor is this true in international politics only. It need some knowledge of economics to judge whether an industrialist is exploiting his workers; he may be paying the highest wages the traffic will bear. It needs psychological understanding to decide whether in a particular situation divorce represents morally the least evil choice.

Similarly, in international politics where the circumstances are no less involved and technical, moral convictions cannot tell what roads are open to a statesman under the specific conditions under which he is forced to act, nor can they reveal what the political consequences and therefore the relative costs in terms of value of any one of several courses of action are likely to be. Will an alliance provoke war or will the failure to make a commitment tempt an aggressor? Will an appeal to the United Nations in a given case help bring about a peaceful settlement or instead create graver tension, perhaps even going so far as to destroy the organization? Disarmament may be morally the best choice under one set of circumstances; it may be downright evil in another in which it would place a nation—and small nations dependent upon it for their security—at the mercy of an ambitious conqueror. The same holds true for all the other panaceas or devices so dear to the heart of those who are most quickly ready to give moral advice to policy-makers or to condemn them for their actions. In one context it may be right to offer concessions whereas in another it may constitute "appeasement" with all of its evil consequences.

There might seem to be one exception to the rule that no general principle can guide non-perfectionist moral judgment on all occasions. It might seem proper to assume that the "defensive" side is always right and that every action is justified and justified only if necessary for the protection and preservation of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

values already possessed. Unfortunately, while individuals can disprove their guilt if they can rightly claim to have acted in self-defense, the case of nations is far more complex. Neither the nation's self nor its possessions are clearly circumscribed. May a nation defend as its self and its possessions only its territorial integrity and independence, or does the right of self-defense cover a way of life, national honor, living space, prestige, colonial possessions and economic rights abroad? *Status quo* powers whose main concern is the preservation of the values they possess and therefore the defense of the established order are prone to blame all Machiavellianism on those nations that seek to bring about change, whether it be revision of treaties, revolution of the social order or liberation from foreign domination. Yet, the "offensive" side may have a valid case for insisting that it has a vital need for things withheld from it and may rightly value them to a point where any means of attaining them become morally justified. Those who refuse to make the sacrifices of change or who, having brought about an unjust distribution of possessions and power are unwilling to correct it, may be guilty of provoking enmity and aggression. If the Moslems in India or the Zionists in Palestine resorted to violence, they were not defending an existing order but were seeking to establish new and independent national homes through changes in the existing order. They were not necessarily at fault merely because they wanted these changes so urgently or because they despaired of any means short of violence. The *beati possidentes* may be more peaceful and less inclined to initiate open hostility, but their guilt may lie in their self-righteous and blind devotion to the *status quo* or in the resentment which they evoke in others.

Despite the difficulties of doing justice to the statesman and of avoiding the pitfalls of politically dangerous as well as morally untenable condemnations, men who have non-perfectionist and non-nationalistic moral convictions dare not evade the task of moral judgment whether of their own political acts or of the acts of others. Where there is so much room for moral choices as there is in international politics and where the destiny of entire nations depends on these choices, attempts to evade, silence or ignore moral judgment merely play into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the hands of those who relish the uncriticized use or abuse of their power. The Nazi leaders were helped by the climate of moral cynicism which prevailed in Germany. It made it easy for them to justify even the most brutal acts on the grounds of necessity of state or to glorify their freedom from any "decadent" moral inhibitions.

The world will not fail to suffer from the immoral acts of statesmen as of other men in the future as it has in the past, nor does it look as though nations would soon be freed from the bitter consequences of international enmity, or from the appalling sacrifices inflicted and justified in the name of national interest and survival. A single powerful government, engaged for whatever reasons, in a policy of aggression and aggrandizement may force all others into line with its Machiavellian practices, provided these others have the will to survive. In such cases moral exhortations and intentions will serve little unless the causes of such aggression and the dangers inherent in it are removed.

Yet international politics are not beyond the pale of non-nationalistic, non-perfectionist morality. Statesmen need not be fooling either themselves or others if they contend, as they frequently do, that in specific instances they have restrained their nation's quest for power; nor need they apologize if, on occasion they choose a conciliatory or even a generous course of action, though a more egotistical policy would promise more tangible national benefits. Despite the continued strength of nationalist sentiment in all parts of the world, there is no reason to assume that people value national benefits only. They often attach a great deal of value to a good record of international collaboration and at times applaud a leader who takes risks for the good will, the amity or the interests of other nations—or seeks to keep his own conscience and that of his people clear.

This explains why under certain circumstances a national government might receive the backing of its people even in sacrificing national independence itself, particularly if it were done for the purpose of establishing a better international order, perhaps a world-wide federation. From the point of view of non-nationalistic ethics such national self-sacrifice for world govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment might appear morally justified if there was assurance of enough amity and all-round consent to permit the establishment and functioning of an orderly and humane government of the world; it might be condemned if it led to world tyranny or world anarchy. There are historical instances when such sacrifice of independence has justified itself in the eyes of almost everybody, as when the thirteen American states federated successfully.

Under the circumstances usually prevailing in a multi-state system painful limitations are set on policies of self-negation, generosity or restraint of power. It would be utopian to expect drastic changes in this respect. But to say that the field of international politics is reserved for selfishness, brutality, self-righteousness or unrestrained ambition for power is not only cynical but manifestly unrealistic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON BOUNDARIES

By ERIC FISCHER

IN judging a boundary from a geographer's point of view many physical as well as human aspects come under consideration. Stress has shifted from one aspect of the problem to another according to the particular bias of the times.

At the time of the Paris peace conferences, geographers shared the general opinion that the linguistic factor should receive the greatest consideration in determining boundaries between national states. Language was regarded as the best criterion for drawing boundaries which would recognize what was called at that date "the right of self-determination." It was a new factor in diplomatic negotiations. Shift of emphasis from physical features to cultural characteristics as bases for boundary lines reflected the popular swing toward self-determination.

A further change of attitude seems to have developed in recent years. The negotiations and treaties which followed World War II changed relatively few boundaries in southeastern Europe, the area of the most involved linguistic and national problems. More adjustments were made by resorting to other means, such as exchanges of population. Precise determination of the linguistic border was undertaken in only one case, that of Trieste, and the meticulous investigations to ascertain the exact site of the boundary there cannot dissipate the suspicion that they were primarily intended to camouflage other purposes, strategical and political. In all other cases the peacemakers in 1945, whether they succeeded or not, were primarily and openly concerned with the economic effects of their decisions. This shift in stress within a short time from one factor to another reflects the transient character of some criteria of boundary-making.

History a Neglected Factor

So far, however, geographers have given little more than transient attention to historical boundaries. This task has been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left to historians and to politicians without geographical interests. Where boundary sites of previous times have influenced the redrawing of boundaries after wars, they have done so mostly because of their traditional or prestige value, and almost never because of the geographical significance of their previous existence. Yet historical boundaries are geographically important, even if political geographers discuss them merely as background material to their particular treatment of the subject or as an example in support of a particular thesis.

It has been pointed out that a boundary is unlikely to have remained in a fixed position if it did not coincide with some physical or human factor hospitable to it. But so far only physiographic features have drawn the attention of geographers as factors working for persistence of boundaries. As a consequence, "artificial" boundaries, i.e., those not naturally marked, especially if they have lasted for a considerable time, have always been a difficult problem for geographers. They have tried to find formerly overlooked geographical foundations for selected artificial boundaries and have thereby gained valuable insights. In some cases, however, it remains doubtful whether the established geographical factor is not accidental and entirely insufficient to explain the boundary location.

Though there are, and have existed, numerous artificial boundaries, especially if we include under this head those which conform with minor natural features, it often seems futile to look for a satisfactory geographical foundation for their persistence. On the other hand, it is important to stress the fact that every boundary, artificial though it may have been when set up, leaves some lasting imprint upon the human geography of the area.

Each boundary, whether naturally marked or not, tends to create by its very existence certain conditions which are ponderable factors in further boundary-making. The longer a boundary functions, especially an international boundary, the harder it becomes to alter it. The transportation net gets adjusted to the boundary, market towns take their specific importance from it, habits of the local population are shaped

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by it, ideas are moulded under the impact of different educational systems.

The South Tyrol an Example of Rapid Change

A case in point is that of the South Tyrol. When this territory was given to Italy in 1919 purely strategic considerations governed the decision. The boundary, as drawn, had the merit that it followed the highest crest and divide of the main chain of the Alps, a widely glaciated and uninhabited zone. But

(I) THE BRENNER BOUNDARY



it also separated purely German-speaking districts on either side of the boundary (Map I). Furthermore, in summer, herds and herdsmen crossed this crest at many places. Individuals owned Alpine pastures on opposite slopes, as did village communities, often for centuries. Most observers, a quarter of a century ago, condemned this boundary as largely artificial despite its adherence to an outstanding but single geographical feature. They felt that the economic, transportation, and especially the linguistic considerations should not have been neglected.

After the conclusion of World War II, when the question of the South Tyrol was reopened, the situation had changed materially. Whereas, in 1919 the South Tyrol had no connec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion with the Italian economy, by 1945 electric power works had been constructed which made the area essential to Italy. The Big Four judged it more important not to separate a large proportion of North Italian industries and railroads from their sources of power than to conform to the linguistic boundary. Nothing of similar economic importance had existed in 1919 nor was it foreseen.

In other words the Brenner boundary has been changing from a strategic to an economic line. At the same time the national character of the area has changed. While at the time of its establishment this boundary could not be justified as a linguistic boundary at all, it now separates, for long stretches, German-speaking areas in the North from mixed German- and Italian-speaking areas in the south. All indications are that this process of Italianization will go on, even if at a slower pace since the abandonment of Fascist methods. The higher birth rate of the Italian population will be one factor working towards this result.

At the peace conference this time, a defensible case could be made for retaining the Brenner border. Its continued existence for another two or three decades probably will create anthropogeographic conditions which, together with the physiographic ones, will more than justify the retention of the boundary at its present location. What started as a boundary imposed by force and based on a geographical foundation of doubtful validity is acquiring geographical soundness by the actions associated with its continued existence.

Bohemia's Mountain Boundaries Overlaid by Human Factors

Let us turn our attention to one of the oldest European boundaries. In some places between the Bohemian core of Czechoslovakia and Germany the boundaries have changed little since the dawn of history. Bohemia is an ideal geographical unit occupying a basin closed in by a heavily wooded continuous mountain belt (Map II). Like the Pyrenees between France and Spain it is often cited as an example of a natural boundary. Closer investigation, however, discloses that this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once notable natural boundary has become overlaid by a secondary boundary of human habits. This is not to say that mountains and forests have ceased to be obstacles to man. But the centuries-long existence of the boundary has created economic, social, and human relations which reach out in opposite directions on the two sides of the boundary. This fact has been obscured for many observers whose minds were preoccupied by consideration of the more tangible wooded moun-



tains. It particularly holds true for the part of the boundary where Bohemia borders Saxony. Here, the forests have been cleared in a number of places. Many clearings lead without interruption from the Bohemian side to the Saxon side. The ascent is so gentle from the Saxon side that the upper valleys on the Bohemian slope actually have been settled by colonists coming from Germany rather than from the interior of Bohemia. Nevertheless, these German colonists of old have become closely integrated into the economic, social, and administrative organization of Bohemia. Especially has this been true since the 16th century when the people of Saxony became

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lutherans, while the population on the Bohemian side was forced to stay in the Roman Catholic Church.

Even during times when this boundary was hardly more than an internal boundary—when Bohemia and Saxony both were member states of the Holy Roman Empire and later on of the Germanic League, and Germans lived on both sides of the border—social contacts were less frequent across the border than between villages and towns on the same side. People who had to go to the same district court and were dependent on the same markets were bound by the stronger ties, and this influenced social intercourse, as reflected for example in the marriage statistics. This is true also of the Bohemian-Silesian border where Germans on both sides belong to the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, the trade area of Saxon Dresden and Chemnitz extended beyond the international boundary. So did the area of local customers frequenting the Bohemian spas. These complications will be discussed later.

What we see on the borders of Bohemia is the gradual development of an anthropogeographic boundary on the line of an older physiographic boundary. And it should be stressed that this anthropogeographic boundary has been created by the establishment of the international boundary on the location of the physiographic boundary. When Hitler tried to abolish this boundary by the forcible annexation of the Sudetenland, the final repercussion of his action led to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. This line of division has thus become a linguistic boundary also.

It is noteworthy that a significant number of Germans would have preferred to stay on, accepting denationalization, even if they had to send their children to Czech schools. It would be a mistake to attribute this attitude in every case to economic motives, though they may have been decisive in many individual cases. But whatever the motive, these Germans were ready to accept greater isolation from the "common German Fatherland" rather than to sacrifice the economic, social, and traditional bonds with Bohemia. The interaction of human and physiographical factors rather than the physiographical factor alone has worked for the remarkable persistence of this boundary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Persistence of Internal Boundaries

It is not without significance that the Bohemian boundary existed as an internal boundary for centuries. The tendency of internal boundaries to persist has been noticed more often than the same tendency of international boundaries. But the facts are essentially the same. Local pride is the outward expression of sociological factors operating in small units. For instance, having gone to the same school is a uniting factor because of the uniform ideology imparted. As such it is primarily a sociological factor. It is a geographical factor as well because most schools draw their students from a definite area.

The longer and the more definitely any kind of boundary has existed the stronger such sociological—and at the same time geographical factors, i.e., anthropogeographical—factors grow. This is true even in cases of proposed incorporations of autonomous communities into a growing city. Economic and administrative advantages, such as result from the unified management of public utilities, are often discounted by local pride. In very old cities the intervention of a dictator or a revolution is required to carry through even seemingly imperative changes. Nothing short of the autocratic rule of Napoleon III sufficed to raze the walls of Paris. One of the first acts of the Nazis after the seizure of Austria in 1938 was to expand the city limits of Vienna and some other Austrian cities. Significant of the staying power of a traditional status quo is the fact that these changes were revoked immediately after the liberation of Austria in 1945, regardless of the more than defensible economic and administrative points in their favor.

Even more difficult to change than city limits are other internal boundaries. Except for the separation of West Virginia from Virginia during the Civil War, there has been no change in the boundaries of any eastern state since the first years after the revolution. And most of those changes which have occurred, were made before the states concerned had ceased to be territories. There may be many valid reasons for altering some of the lines which serve as state boundaries or for amal-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gamating states, but few people would venture to suggest that such a proposal would easily succeed, however well founded it might be.

The replacement of the historical French provinces by the present-day departments was effected only by the French Revolution and it took the deep shock of World War II to bring about any disposition towards consolidating the departments into larger units more adequate to modern conditions. The abolition of the Czarist *gouvernements* in favor of new, federated national republics as a result of the Russian Revolution also illustrates the persistence of historical boundaries. Where they lacked any historical background these new boundaries have been changed several times during the last thirty years. But as might be expected, in cases where these federal republics fell heir to historical traditions, as in the Ukraine and Georgia, their boundaries have not been subject to as many adjustments.

"Uncrystallized Boundaries"

It seems relatively easy to change internal boundaries before they have crystallized. It is not so much a question of prestige as of those social, administrative, and economic connections which may bind the inhabitants of one area closer to one another than to even nearer neighbors across a boundary. The county line or the state line may be crossed at will, but usually contacts with civic affairs or courts of law are confined within the line. Social connections are more likely to be established where business interests preceded them. But a boundary can have such effects only when it has remained stable for a long time.

Many easy changes of state boundaries took place during their formative years. This holds true even of a state such as Utah, whose original boundaries had a clean-cut physiographic basis and had, because Utah was founded by a religious community, emotional value from the beginning. In spite of these facts Utah's boundaries not only underwent changes during the state's period of territorial probation, but they were easily and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shortly forgotten.[1] On the other hand, in Idaho, where until quite recently the northern part of the state had no intrastate connection with the southern part, agitation for a change remained ineffective once that territory had become a state.

Persistence in Relict Boundaries

Age alone does not insure the continued use of a boundary. Many long-established boundaries have been changed. Even in such cases, however, we can observe how traces of boundaries remain in the human landscape after their formal status has disappeared. An extreme example is offered by the survival of highway locations, bridge sites, and urban road patterns in the once Roman part of Germany. It is surprising that these should have left more than faint vestiges after fifteen centuries, but they are still unmistakably recognizable. They very definitely influenced the trade routes and thereby also other contacts of the people, especially before the coming of the railroads. The patterns prevailing in other parts of Germany are well known to any historian or geographer and are entirely different.

The distinctive character of the Western and Southern Germans in the once Roman parts of Germany is generally recognized and frequently connected with the old Roman *limes* or boundaries. Street patterns which invoke historical reminiscences, old buildings and ruins, traditions connected with certain localities impress the mind from earliest childhood. This holds true of any place with historical traditions. Texans and Californians, whenever they arrive in their respective state, acquire quickly the peculiar local pride. The descendants of the 17th century immigrants have no monopoly upon typical New England pride. It is strong also in more recent immigrants. They are not lineal descendants of the original New Englanders (just as the Catholic Bavarians or Rhinelanders are not of Gallic or Roman extraction) but they have come under influences which did not affect the people in other part of the United States.

[1] George F. Brightman, "The Boundaries of Utah," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 16 (1940), pp. 87-96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The survival of boundaries of princely dominions in the form of religious boundaries provide more recent as well as more striking instances of these localized influences. The feudal and ecclesiastical borders in Alsace-Lorraine, for example, are largely recognizable in the present distribution of Catholics and Protestants. This is the more remarkable in that these feudal boundaries developed rather haphazardly and few of them endured very long in the same location. But it is not so much the absolute number of years which ensures persistence, as the fact that important changes took place during the boundary's existence. The relatively high cultural development on the Roman side of the *limes,* the economic and linguistic changes on the southern side of the Brenner, the Reformation in the Protestant territories—these developments reinforced the staying power of the particular boundaries.

That less noticeable differences will also accumulate over a period of time, and work for the persistence of a boundary, may be illustrated by the following example: The semi-independent archbishopric of Trento gradually had its boundary stabilized in the north by a narrow gorge of the Adige valley, and by rugged mountains east and west of it. But the language distribution showed little relation to this naturally marked boundary at the time when it first was established. Only after the boundary had existed for a considerable length of time did the archbishopric's territory become almost coextensive with the Italian language area, and the Hapsburg area of direct rule in the Tyrol approximate that of the German language. The Romansh language, which once straddled the boundary, disappeared from the Tyrol; the Ladin survived only in a small area on both sides of the historical boundary. It should be noted that this Germanization and Italianization of the Romansh and part of the Ladins occured at a period when policies justified by language were not yet thought of. It came about as a gradual adaptation to the majority, or perhaps rather to the language of the authorities. The effectiveness of merely ecclesiastical dominion in the case of Trento is the more remarkable and significant because this ecclesiastical principality was governed as part of the Hapsburg Tyrol for at least

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two centuries before it was abolished legally in 1803. Nevertheless, the language boundary is still evident.

What concerns us in this context is the fact that the politics of archbishops and counts and dukes felt the restrictive influence of the physiographic factors very early. The linguistic boundary was established on these separating barriers only subsequently. Few people realized that the language boundary

(III) THE SOUTH TYROL



is only indirectly related to the physiographic division through an historical boundary which had become obsolete as such centuries ago, i.e., the historical boundary of the archbishopric Trento with the Tyrol (Map III).

Language and religious boundaries are relatively easy to put on a map. Other anthropogeographic traits have only recently been subject to cartographic presentation. Some of these are given in a detailed study of the 1919 boundary change in Upper Silesia. Upper Silesia, however, is less often cited as an example of persistence than as an example of how a boundary which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had existed for centuries had become obsolete in the face of recent developments.[2]

Concurrent Persistence and Obsolescence

These and similar examples pose the problem that some boundaries apparently become obsolete and that once-established boundaries tend to persist through their impact upon the human landscape. We can recognize two cases: when a unit as a whole is to be incorporated in another state and when the boundary between two units has to be changed. In both cases the old boundary will lose its original function. In the case of complete incorporation this means, as a rule, a change of its character from an international to an internal boundary, but not complete abandonment. Thus a given boundary may show persistence and obsolescence at the same time.

We may also reverse the statement and say: if a boundary has lost much of its original function the time has come to change its legal status. Some of the almost insuperable obstacles to change even in cases of internal boundaries have been

[2] R. Hartshorne, "Geographic and Political Boundaries in Upper Silesia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 23 (1933), pp. 195ff. The recent history of Upper Silesia shows how long a former boundary may persist before changing values find their expression in a new one. The old boundary created by dynastic divisions and maintained by dynastic power had a natural setting in a sandy, infertile, forested, thinly settled zone. Small streams were used as naturally marked boundary lines. The development of coalfields, mines, and industry created a coherent, but hardly integrated industrial landscape on both sides of the border. This and the influx of workers from other regions pushed into the background the physiographical features which had determined the location of the boundary. At the same period the Poles of Upper Silesia for the first time became acutely aware of their separation from the Poles in the then Russian Poland. So the boundary gradually lost its foundation. But it took World War I, originated extraneously, to break the old boundary down. There seems little reason to doubt that without this war it could have persisted for a very long time, without even seeming to be a major cause of friction.

The Versailles boundary in this area proved especially unsatisfactory, perhaps not so much because it did not solve the nationality problem, as because it put this problem into high relief and added to it economic hardships. Power lines, roads, urban streetcar lines, sewage systems, were cut apart. The dismemberment of such utilities cannot but focus the attention of all directly concerned on the disadvantages of the border. Hartshorne has shown that the pre-1918 Russian-German boundary in Upper Silesia was clearly visible in the nationally, physiographically, climatically, etc., uniform Polish landscape. The cultural pattern of each side of the abolished boundary still widely differed from the other in the greater or lesser importance of livestock, difference in yield of crops, domestic practices, and material used for house-building. It will be interesting to observe how far the historical boundary will still be recognizable in the new Poland and whether the Versailles boundary, despite its brief existence, can still be detected in the human landscape a few years from now.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentioned before. In the case of international boundaries a change of function is usually legally recognized only after a war. However, peaceful changes of boundary functions have occurred, as in the gradual absorption of some of the Indian states into British India. As allies of the British Crown their legal status hardly changed. But as the Government of India assumed more and more economic and administrative functions in their behalf, the international boundaries lost some of their functions and, therefore, also some of their importance. The additional strengthening of interstate ideological bonds as a corollary to the growing ascendency of the Indian Congress and Congress Party reduced once international boundaries to hardly more than a legal fiction. Even this fiction disappeared when India became a dominion in 1947. The process is still in flux at the time of this writing because of the resistance of Hyderabad and Kashmir. The rapid occupation of Hyderabad by the Indian army in September, 1948, carried the process of integration a long step forward, but the situation in Kashmir may yet lead to a full-scale war.

In similar cases war has often followed. Texas became a part of the United States economically and in consanguinity long before it became so in law. It joined the United States only after a revolution and war had confirmed the development. The international boundaries between the U. S. S. R. and a number of East European countries have lost much of their meaning since Communist parties have taken over their governments, but it is still too early to assert that no war will be needed for the final confirmation of these boundaries. Only in the semi-deserts of Central Asia has this type of transition run its full course. Tannu Tuva, originally a part of the Chinese Empire, has come to its present position as an integral part of the U. S. S. R. through the stages of autonomy, as a part of Mongolia, as a republic at least nominally independent, and as a protectorate of the Soviet Union.

In all these cases, an existing international boundary lost first its actual function, later its legal status. A new international boundary took its place, possibly one which existed previously but between other political units. In most of our examples it is a pre-existing boundary of secondary importance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which becomes an international boundary. Not the boundary as such is new, but the character of its function.

The Rhine as a Resurrected Boundary

Among the boundaries apt to grow in importance and to develop into international boundaries, former international boundaries play an interesting part. As they have impressed their imprint upon the human landscape in a former period, so in their revival they may function relatively smoothly. We shall present one example in detail: the Rhine boundary between Germany and France. This example is especially interesting because of the natural features involved. Indeed, the case of the Rhine is often cited as one depending wholly on physical features, but it will be seen that this is not the full story.

The Rhine river became the boundary between the Roman Empire and the Germanic tribes in Caesar's time. Between the present cities of Basel and Mannheim it is a swiftly running river of considerable depth and width, bordered by marshes on the left bank. During prehistoric times up to Caesar's conquest of Gaul, the river had apparently been crossed frequently by Germanic and Celtic tribes. But in those times no body politic existed in the area. With the extension of the Roman Empire to the left bank of the Rhine, the river became a formidable barrier to intercourse. It likewise slowly assumed the nature of a cultural divide. After the fall of the Roman Empire, with the gradual disintegration of the Roman road net, rivers became the most important highways of the Middle Ages. Boats plied the Rhine from one little city to the next, crossing and recrossing. Under these circumstances its barrier function decreased or disappeared. The duchy of Swabia, the Palatinate, and many small principalities and ecclesiastical states straddled the river. In the period since the 18th century, the size of river barges increased, shifting the head of navigation downstream from Basel to Mannheim. Highways were built and improved. Later railroads were constructed parallel to the river. As a result, the barrier function of this part of the Rhine river was felt anew and reinforced. The 20th century has again reversed this trend. River regulation, parallel canals, and irriga-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(IV) THE RHINE RIVER & THE VOSGES



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion projects tend to promote the common interests of the two banks (Map IV).

Two mountain ridges, the Schwarzwald (Black Forest) to the east, and the Vosges to the west, trend parallel to the Rhine. The crests of these mountain chains are only about 25 miles apart; both are heavily forested and slope steeply towards the Rhine Valley. Even today these highlands form material obstacles to traffic and represent zones of very thin settlement. Their separating power is obvious, although only the Vosges have served as an international boundary.

The effectiveness of the Vosges, like that of the Rhine river, has been subject to variation. It was most pronounced in the Dark Ages—and presumably in prehistoric times,—when forests spread farthest and man possessed no means of coping with problems of large-scale clearing, or utilization of marginal land. But they have also been effective barriers at two other completely different periods, the technologically advanced age of the Roman Empire and again in modern times. These intervals occurred when traffic tended to concentrate on two or three lines. When the highways of Rome, or the railroads of recent history, attracted all the traffic, the Vosges area became a zone hardly ever crossed. At the end of the Middle Ages, when deforestration had advanced farthest and byroads played a proportionally more important part in commerce, the dividing function was weakest.

We have, therefore, a case of two parallel lines, Rhine river and Vosges Mountains, competing with each other for the site of the boundary. At periods when technological circumstances favored one of them, the political development tended, after a time, to follow. In the later Middle Ages when the barrier function of both had degenerated, only secondary and short-lived boundaries existed here. A broad zone of French and German mixed population gave way only gradually to a sharp boundary line. Since the 17th century, questions of prestige, of history-conscious nationalism, and since the 19th century, of language, have entered and complicated the picture. At all times there have been instances when either a medieval knight or a mighty modern nation acted in disregard of existing con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ditions. However, the clearly marked geographical barrier zones have attracted international boundaries time and again.

The problem arises, however, why the Black Forest zone, the almost exact counterpart of the Vosges, did not figure in this shifting of boundaries. The Black Forest never bore an international boundary between great nations, but boundaries of secondary importance only. The Black Forest was not a linguistic boundary, nor were the Rhine or, for a long time, the Vosges. But the historical function of the Vosges and Rhine, and all the anthropogeographical factors that go with it, made them acceptable boundaries time and again. Without the Roman Rhine boundary the differences between the two sides of the Rhine would not have developed from such an early time. Although the Roman Rhine boundary finally gave way and German has been spoken on both sides of the Rhine since the Dark Ages, the Rhine remained a potential boundary because of the surviving cultural differences between the two banks. And similarly the Vosges, originally a wild border zone, a no-man's land between tribes, developed only at a later date into an international boundary despite its physiographic advantages. Only after it had served as an international boundary for some time, did it harden into a dividing line of much greater importance than the physiographic factors alone would justify. On the other hand the Black Forest never bore an international boundary and, therefore, never acquired the quality which made it desirable for a renewed international boundary. France never pushed her boundary so far to the east.

The Crystallization of Boundaries

With our own eyes we can observe this hardening of originally quite meaningless "paper" boundaries drawn at a conference table and destined to have no real existence for many years afterwards. In Africa are found the classical examples of such boundaries drawn through unexplored areas. But it is difficult to change them now that they have functioned for several decades. There have been, it is true, exchanges of territory in Africa and they have been accomplished there much more easily than elsewhere. We may take this as a sign that the boundary had not yet had a definite impact upon the human land-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scape, i.e., colonial boundaries were antecedent, while indigenous boundaries were uncrystallized. It takes time for a boundary to become a decisive factor in dividing cultural areas.

Nevertheless, in such areas of uncrystallized boundaries the germs of conflict exist. There are today in Africa many cases where the transformation into an historical boundary has not yet taken place. Since the end of World War II the Ewe people in West Africa have been campaigning for the unity of their tribal territory which was divided between France, Great Britain, and before 1919, Germany. Today the Ewe are no longer negligible natives. They have leaders, educated in Western standards, acquainted with and affected by modern national ideas. They are campaigning for the abolition of antecedent colonial boundaries before the latter become definitive, making two divisions of their people, one conforming to a British cultural pattern, the other to a French pattern (Map V).

In this case it is not possible to argue for restoring the historical boundaries of the Ewe people. An institution such as a demarcated boundary line never existed under primitive conditions although the tribe controlled a well recognized area. It may be necessary to adopt a new boundary line without historical precedent, because no adequate historical boundary exists. Or it may be desirable to adopt a pre-existent secondary boundary line as the new international boundary.

Secondary Boundaries

Secondary boundary lines exist very often roughly parallel to an active international boundary. The French geographer Capot-Rey, has traced them in detail along the France-Saar boundary[8] (May VI). His observations could be applied to the whole length of the northern French boundary towards the Saar, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Where these boundaries are crossed by workers going to daily work, it is possible to draw a line on a map which includes the commuting zone. A roughly parallel line would show the area from which seasonal labor comes, another line the area which delivers dairy

[8] Robert Capot-Rey, *La région sarroise*, Nancy, 1934.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(V) THE EWE TERRITORY



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

products across the boundary. The international boundary remains the most important of those lines. It is also the one which in the end determines the location of the others. French towns and mines would have a commuting area even if no international boundary existed; but it would take a different shape in the absence of an international boundary which produces its special effect on living standards, prices, roads, and railroads on both sides of the border and so deforms the area.

In the example of the Bohemian boundary we briefly referred to the fact that trade areas of cities such as Dresden or Chemnitz extended across the boundary. At times these trade areas extended even farther than they would have without a boundary because of the favorable rate of exchange for Czech money at certain periods. At other periods a different rate of exchange crippled the trade area considerably. The same is true, from the other side of the boundary, for the area which attracted local visitors to the Bohemian spas. We can also observe how not only money fluctuations, but political measures affected these secondary boundaries very strongly while the international boundary remained fixed in its place.

The field operations of the United Fruit Company, the area of seasonal migration of Mexican workers, the commuting zone of workers across the Canadian boundary are examples from the American continent. In all these cases a group is largely integrated into the economy of a state other than that to which it belongs. This is not only true of the migrating worker and his family, and of the worker on the United Fruit Company plantation, but to a diminishing degree also of businesses and public services which cater to them. But at the same time these people are expected to retain their national loyalties. They remain integrated in the system of public administration, public education, and state-operated services of their country of origin. If they are citizens of countries with compulsory military training they are subject to that conscription.

It is evident that we witness in all these and similar cases the development of potential future boundaries and also the emergence of a new kind of boundary zone, a zone of economic and social penetration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are two other kinds of boundary zones. The primitive boundary zone is characteristic of tribal territories and states just emerging from tribal status. It is a no-man's land used by neither of the adjacent nations. During historical times such no-man's land zones have tended to narrow and to develop into definite boundary lines and, with the exception of the Arabian peninsula, have practically disappeared from the map. Another type of boundary consists of defense zones or shells, as described by Whittlesey.[4] They are formed behind the boundary line as a kind of inner membrane. Customs buildings, fortresses, lopsided trade areas of towns, etc., mark them. These defense shells are inside the country, while no-man's lands and zones of economic and social penetration lie outside, but adjacent to, its border. Zones of economic and social penetration as well as defense shells may be formed as a double belt under the influence of both neighboring countries. Such are the areas of influence on the two sides of the Saxon-Bohemian border discussed above, the Maginot line and the West wall which faced each other along the French-German border only a few years ago. But it is safe to state that the more such defense shells are developed between two more or less antagonistic states, the less likely is the formation of secondary zones of mutual economic and social penetration.

Ancient and Modern Boundary Zones

The modern boundary zone of defense is comparable to the primitive "no-man's land" boundary zones; but, unlike them, it is located within the state and not outside. The boundary zone of economic and social penetration, which has no exact parallel under primitive conditions, finds one in feudal medieval Europe. During this period, a man had in some cases to obey the summons to arms of one prince, but go to a court appointed by another prince, and give homage to the ecclesiastical sovereignty of yet another. Some of these allegiances lost ground to others. Thus came about slowly and gradually the adjustment between more and less important boundaries.

[4] Derwent Whittlesey, "The Impress of Effective Central Authority Upon the Landscape," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 25 (1935), pp. 85ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When Silesia was ceded by Austria to Prussia in the 18th century, ecclesiastical allegiance was still strong and independent enough so that some areas retained by Austria depended on the then Prussian archbishop of Breslau. Not until the 20th century were the diocesan boundaries adapted to the political ones. In contrast, after World War I, the Vatican promptly aligned its diocesan boundaries to conform to the new political boundaries. This is a silent, perhaps unconscious acknowledgment of changing values.

The zonal nature of boundaries is also illustrated by the fact that the most rigid political boundaries have been modified time and again by economic agreements, even if only for brief periods and for the relief of a small group of border people. Considered from this point of view the national minorities problem is only a special case. Yugoslavs living in Italian territory are culturally within the same area as their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, even if economically and in other respects they are integrated into the Italian state. The Alsatians regarded Paris as their cultural capital from 1871 to 1914, when they were politically part of the German Reich. The case of the Sudeten Germans is well known. Despite their integration into Bohemia, many of them regarded themselves first of all as Germans and others acknowledged their connection with Germany in some cultural respects. The Germans even coined the expression *Grenzlanddeutsche* (borderland Germans) for these Sudeten Germans and for similarly located people to distinguish them not only from Germans living within the Reich, but also from the *Auslanddeutsche,* i.e., those living in areas not contiguous to Germany.

In none of these cases has the use of a linguistic boundary as an international boundary worked smoothly. A linguistic-national boundary will work smoothly as an international boundary only if historical developments have permitted the evolution of social, economic, and administrative ties conforming to its pattern; in other words, if it is an historical boundary. A linguistic-national boundary not so supported is hardly workable. The modern state, of course, is powerful enough to enforce any border regulations it chooses and if the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imposed boundary is maintained long enough, it may develop into an acceptable one.

Change and Persistence of Secondary and National Boundaries

The international boundary is not only the most important among a series of roughly parallel boundaries, it is also the least flexible one. Economic boundaries especially, are changing continuously. The change of a railroad schedule may influence commuting areas; boom or depression may do the same. The trade area of a city expands or shrinks with changes of economic conditions—quite independently of the international boundary.

Non-economic social conditions also play a part. These may work as well for stability as for change. A long time after the economic situation has ceased to justify it, customers will frequent their accustomed market towns because of social and personal contacts or merely from habit. Secondary linguistic-national boundaries may change more slowly, and for that reason, at least during the last one hundred years, they have proved to be more disruptive than secondary economic boundaries. But they may also change, even without the drastic expedient of transfer or exchange. Assimilation takes place; changes in national consciousness are far from negligible. German-speaking Alsatians were French in their own eyes, Polish-speaking Upper Silesians voted for Germany in the plebiscite of 1920. German-speaking Austrians considered themselves German or not at different times.

Among the least changeable factors are those of human geography which develop under the imprint of an international boundary. They tend to assert themselves after periods of suppression because of economic changes, technological developments, or power politics. Because of such changes the importance of some boundaries may be latent for a period, that of others may wane after a period of eminence. But the historical boundary remains a geographical factor.

The fluctuating character of boundaries may be seen in the Eastern Europe of today. To avoid more complex examples, let us consider the international boundary between Russia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Finland. During the late Middle Ages and early modern period it crystallized out of an almost uninhabited no-man's land as the international boundary between Sweden and Russia. In 1809, incidental to the Napoleonic Wars, Finland was joined to Russia as an autonomous principality; the boundary consequently lost importance. But one hundred years more elapsed before it lost all the functions usually attributed to an international boundary. Only during the very last years of Czarism did Finland's boundary become like that of any other internal, provincial boundary within the Russian Empire. World War I revived its function as an international boundary and probably made it a stricter barrier than ever before. As a sequel to World War II, Finland has been gradually drawn into the Soviet orbit and accordingly the boundary—we are considering only the still unchanged stretches—may lose some of its separating power.

Lord Curzon spoke of the northwestern boundary of India as a threefold line and geographers commonly have accepted his definition.[5] In his time, around the turn of the century, the North West Frontier Province of India was established. The British maintained order and administrative service in that part of this territory which had been taken from the Punjab (British India). From the provincial boundary up to the international boundary they merely prevented the tribes from launching raids into India and protected them in turn from Afghan incursions. Afghanistan on the farther side was an independent country linked to Great Britain and India by treaties which made its northern international boundary with Russia the outer defense line of the British-Indian Empire. These treaties were abolished in 1920 and consequently, with the establishment of the full sovereignty of Afghanistan, its international boundaries with both India and Russia changed their meaning.

In 1947, the strong British-Indian Empire was replaced by the far weaker Dominion of Pakistan. The result is that the northern Afghan boundary with the Soviet Union can no longer be regarded as a potential frontier of Pakistan. On the contrary, Afghanistan has been trying to extend its influence over the

[5] George Nathaniel Curzon, *Frontiers*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1907, 2nd ed., 1908.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tribes between the international and the administrative boundaries in Pakistan. The British undertook the exclusion of the Afghans from this territory, but did not incorporate it or exert administrative control. It is doubtful whether Pakistan will be able to maintain this status quo. According to news coming from Pakistan it is more likely that the administrative boundary is already changing its status to an international boundary. Such a gradual peaceful change would not be possible at all if there were no older, historical boundary lying ready to reassume its function.

The Interaction of Boundary-making Factors

Lately much attention has been paid, especially under the influence of the geopoliticians, to changes of boundaries under the pressure of increasing or decreasing power of nations and countries. These ideas have found favor among power-minded statesmen. Geopoliticians and their followers contend that the stationary location of a boundary is rather rare and in any case would be of little interest. They have tried to show that a boundary never can be regarded as fixed in position, but only as a momentary and transitory expression of the power of the adjacent countries. This point of view seems to explain rather well some developments under unsettled conditions, such as the rapidly fluctuating status of the boundaries of Manchuria during the last half century. Stimulating vistas are opened. Nevertheless, this geopolitical idea of boundaries cannot be accepted. Its almost exclusive emphasis on strategic and power values is a serious drawback. Its overemphasis on dynamic change obscures factors working for stability. The boundaries of Manchuria, for example, have lost and gained importance, have changed functions, but they have remained essentially at the same location.

The current stress on change has been reinforced by economically-minded observers. Economic changes, it is true, are occurring continuously, and their influence on boundaries is not to be denied. But economic changes do not alter international boundaries so much or so directly as they shift the secondary lines of the zones of economic and social penetration. The international boundary may remain stationary and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retain its primary function, i.e., the separation of independent political entities, though the induced secondary economic boundaries are shifting all the while.

Against these factors working for change in international boundaries geographers have usually stressed the stabilizing influence of physiographic factors. Sea shores, rugged and glaciated, as well as densely forested mountain chains, gorges, swift streams, swamps, and deserts have attracted attention to their boundary-marking function. Their importance seems to have declined due to technological advances; areas can be utilized which had been waste land before; population density has increased; but most important, many of the naturally marked boundaries are rapidly losing their value as protective belts, since neither the highest mountains nor the broadest deserts are an obstacle to the airplane.

Therefore, it is necessary to stress another stabilizing factor, history. A boundary may originally have been established because of a convenient, naturally marked site; but whether this has been the case or not, once a boundary has been established, the human landscapes on the two sides of the frontier are bound to develop in different ways. In some areas only after the international boundary has existed for some length of time has the linguistic boundary taken definitive form in accordance with it. Religious affiliations have often been determined by the international boundary. Road building, clearing of forests, drainage of swamps may be carried through at a different pace or following a different pattern, and habits will develop accordingly. Public education is responsible in modern times for implanting different sets of values. Social connections are often limited by the border. Such anthropogeographic traits are often regarded as rather fleeting. In fact, however, they are able to survive a vanished boundary for a very long time.

This does not mean that history determines an unchangeable pattern. It means that it is a stabilizing factor, sometimes even superseding the physiographic factor, always interacting with all the other factors, those working for persistence as well as those working for change.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE THIRTY-EIGHTH PARALLEL IN KOREA

By SHANNON McCUNE

THE 38th parallel in Korea marks a critical segment of the 'international frontier' between the two worlds into which our one globe seems to be dividing. South of the line is the American-sponsored and U. N.-approved Korean Republic. North of the parallel is the Soviet-backed Korean Peoples' Republic. Both of these governments claim jurisdiction over all of Korea. Both seem to follow the most extreme aspects of the political philosophies of their backers. Thus Korea, a long-unified nation, has, on its liberation from Japan, been split by a purely geodetic line. This line is found on maps but is not evident in the geographic landscape. One may well wonder about the choice of such a line, its geographic character and its present and future function.

The Origin of the Line

The 38th parallel was chosen for a limited military objective: to define the areas in which the Russian and American military commands would accept the surrender of the Japanese forces. The exact history of the decision to use the 38th parallel rather than some other line is cloaked by the veil of military security. In view of subsequent events the chances of declassification of this information are dim. The frankest official version freely available is as follows:

> Subsequent to the declaration of war upon Japan by the USSR and in preparation for the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a War Department recommendation which later formed the basis for General Order Number One, defining areas of responsibility for accepting the surrender of all Japanese military forces. Among other recommendations prompted by military consideration to achieve this purpose, the one pertaining to Korea provided that Japanese troops north of thirty-eight degrees in Korea

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were to surrender to Soviet forces, while those south of thirty-eight degrees were to surrender to U. S. Forces. . . .

The decision, therefore, is credited to the War Department. It seems likely that it would have been made by a committee of staff planners. Such a group would have been faced with the stupendous task of planning in an extremely short time—a matter of hours—surrender plans for all the far-flung Japanese troops. They would perhaps have learned from intelligence reports that the Russians had already advanced on to Korean soil. The possibility of excluding Russia from any part of the Korean peninsula would therefore have been most difficult. At the same time, such a group would have hesitated to give up any opportunities to put American troops on this strategic toehold on the continent of Asia. The United States during the war had made plain its interest in the future of Korea. In the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, America had joined with China and Britain in declaring that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." This had been reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945. American troops in Korea would be of value in carrying out this policy. The alternative of excluding American troops from participation in the liberation of Korea was hardly thinkable. The committee would therefore have had to choose some means of dividing the responsibilities for the military operation. There was certainly no time for planning any joint operation; the inclination for such an undertaking was probably most remote. They chose the 38th parallel as the dividing line.

It seems logical that various factors would have entered into the choice of the 38th parallel. One important factor would have been previous decisions concerning operations in Korea. During military staff discussions between American and Soviet planners at Yalta and at Potsdam some such line as the 38th may have been mentioned as a dividing line for possible military commands in groundforce or aerial operations. Since at that time the U. S. S. R. was not at war with Japan the discussions would have been kept secret. If such tentative discussions

[1] *Foreign Affairs Background Summary Korea*, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C., August, 1947, p. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had taken place, the staff planners would probably have been strongly influenced by them.

Another factor, a rather obscure but interesting historical precedent, might also have been important if such staff discussions did take place at Yalta or Potsdam. The first reference to the 38th parallel as a possible boundary line in Korea was made by the Japanese in 1896.[2] Marshal Yamagata had been sent to Moscow as the Japanese representative at the coronation of the Tsar. At the time Russo-Japanese relationships were decidedly strained, particularly over Korea, and Yamagata was authorized to carry on negotiations towards a compromise solution. As a first step he proposed a division of the peninsula along the 38th parallel. The Russians were to have a sphere of influence in the north, the Japanese in the south. The proposal was rejected by the Russians on the ground that it would contradict their recognition of the independence of Korea. However, as Langer points out, the Russians were also probably swayed by the complications which might arise with England and America. In addition, such a division would not have allowed the Russians the bases which they desired in southern Korea. Again in 1903 a similar line, the 39th parallel, was proposed, this time by the Russians, as the southern boundary of a neutral zone.[3] The idea of using a parallel to divide Korea, therefore, has had its historical precedents.

The War Department staff committee though perhaps influenced by previous commitments or precedents was, after all, making a decision for a limited objective, i.e., the surrender of Japanese troops. For that purpose the more arbitrary and

[2] References to this fascinating episode in Far Eastern history are rare; I am indebted to John N. Washburn of Columbia University for searching them out. The basic English language reference is William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902,* 2 vols., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1935, Vol. I, p. 406. Langer notes that an account of Yamagata's offer is in the Russian official history of the war with Japan, *Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg. Amtliche Darstellung des Russischen Generalstabes,* Berlin, 1911-1912, Vol. I, p. 66. He derives most of his data, however, from Boris A. Romanov, *Rossia u Manchzhurii, 1892-1906,* Leningrad, 1928, pp. 141-43. Romanov secured his information on this proposal from a memorandum written by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamsdorf entitled "Concerning the memorandum (of Bogak) on the significance of the Treaty of 26 March 1902 in the development of the Manchurian question." This memorandum was presented to Tsar Nicholas II after 7 May 1903 in Dispatch No. 120.

[3] Edward H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946, p. 96, using Romanov, *op. cit.,* p. 447.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

definitive the line, the better. A parallel furnished a line that would be relatively easy for field commanders equipped with maps to ascertain and would not be subject to conflicting interpretations. A slight change in the line, to follow either the provincial or county boundaries, would have made civil government much less difficult. However, it should be stressed that planning for government administration was not in the scope of the group's work. They were to choose a line for military surrender. A clear, simple line, well marked on maps, was likely to appeal to them. Various other factors may have entered into the making of the decision. The 38th was the closest parallel for a rough halving of Korea. The choice of this line put the capital, Seoul, well within the American zone. A similar line, the 16th parallel, was being used in Indo-China.

Whatever the case, for the reasons given here, or for other reasons now hidden by security classifications, the committee chose the 38th parallel. Their decision was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It became the basis for Japanese General Order No. 1 issued on September 2, 1945 by the Japanese Imperial G. H. Q., in accordance with directions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Persons making or approving the dividing line probably had no idea that their hasty decision would last more than a few weeks. Therein lies the tragedy of the 38th parallel. A line adequate or even advantageous for a limited military objective was subsequently used to divide strongly divergent political and economic forces.

The Geographic Character of the 38th Parallel

The 38th parallel is a geodetic line which cuts across Korea indiscriminately.[4] It traverses the Ongjin peninsula along the west coast so that the southern part of that peninsula falls within the American sphere, though cut off from the rest of South Korea by Haeju Bay. For the most part the line goes against the grain of the land forms, so that it crosses a great diversity of mountains, hills and plains. There are minor cli-

[4] A brief description of the line, illustrated by a relief profile, was presented in my article: "Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries," *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. V, No. 3 (May, 1946), pp. 272-88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matic differences along the line. The winter temperatures (the critical climatic variant in Korea) are milder along the Yellow Sea and considerably milder along the deep Japan Sea than they are in the hill lands of the interior. The political administrative lines in Korea have been developed over a long historical period. They usually follow natural features, ridge crests or streams, which denote limits of trading centers. The 38th parallel thus cuts through many political units.

The line itself marks no specific natural or cultural barrier in Korean geography. However, it is significant that there are differences between north and south Korea. These differences are marked in many ways. North Korea is a more mountainous land with small areas of alluvial plains. South Korea has mountains, but highlands are not numerous and alluvial plains are quite common. The climatically-induced differences in growing season make north Korea generally a land of a single agricultural crop whereas in south Korea many of the fields may be double-cropped. With more food, population densities are greater in south Korea; this section has a population of roughly 20,000,000 people, double that of the north, though it is smaller in size. The geologic occurrences of important minerals are such that north Korea has the major deposits of exploitable iron and coal. Because of its terrain the north has great potential water power, some of which was developed by the Japanese. It is a misleading oversimplification to call north Korea industrial and south Korea agricultural, for industry and agriculture are found in both north and south. However, the fact remains that there are significant economic differences between north and south. There are also social and political differences which are harder to assess, but which may be noted. During the centuries of weak central control the Koreans developed provincial traits and loyalties, though they are essentially a unique cultural group with their own language, customs and ideas.

Geographers and other students of Korea have noted the important regional diversity in Korea. Hermann Lautensach in his appraisal of Korea's geographic landscapes divides the peninsula into three major regions: the boundaries he draws between north and central Korea and between central and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

south Korea run from west to east parallel to the 38th parallel, though naturally not following it.[5] Thus, though the present boundary line itself does not mark a distinct geographic division, it does separate regions with physical differences and long-established economic, social and political diversity. The superposition of a rigid barrier over a pattern which already has latent divisive tendencies is most dangerous. The longer such a line persists the stronger will become the differences. The wedge will be widened and perhaps in time will become an unbridgeable gap. The regional diversities, which were elements of strength when Korea was a unit, will be diverted to become critical disruptive forces.

The Continuance of the Boundary

It is obvious that a line with such an origin and of such a character will not be an aid to peace and security. Therefore, many persons have decried it. There have been official utterances by every one concerned, from Mr. Marshall to Comrade Molotov. However, little has actually been done to abolish it. The American commander, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, thrown with little warning into the confusion of power politics, tried to reach some working arrangements with the Soviet commanders that would negate the evils of the line. The exchange of mails, the flow of some electric power in exchange for some manufactured equipment, etc., and the one-way movement of refugees were due in large part to his efforts. However, no real breach was made in the wall. A decision was therefore made at Moscow, December 27, 1945, to establish a Joint Commission of the two commands which would work toward the formation of a unified provisional Korean government. This objective would be accomplished through consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. Such a government would operate under a four-power trusteeship

[5] Hermann Lautensach, *Korea, Eine Landeskunde auf Grund Eigener Reisen und Der Literatur*, Leipzig, 1945. This is a definitive recent work on Korean geography; the map of regions, Tafel 23, faces p. 192. A recent Russian work on Korean geography, V. T. Zaichikov's *Korea*, Moscow, 1947, also shows the regional differences between north and south on a map on p. 123. The problem occasioned by regional diversity in Korea I have discussed in some detail in an article scheduled for publication in the *Korean Review*, Vol. I, No. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for a period up to five years. Eventually an independent Korea would emerge.

The Joint Commission held a series of meetings in the spring of 1946 and again in the spring and summer of 1947, but could accomplish nothing. The immediate point of disagreement was over what 'democratic' Korean groups should be consulted, though in the background lay the world rivalry of the United States and the U. S. S. R. In the fall of 1947, after the Soviet Union had refused to attend a four-power conference on the subject, the United States presented the problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations. With the U. S. S. R. and its satellites abstaining, the Assembly voted to send a Temporary Commission to Korea to examine the problem and, if deemed wise, to supervise an election. The U. S. S. R. maintained its 'negative attitude' and the Commission only operated in southern Korea. Elections for a National Assembly were held on May 10, 1948 in south Korea and were followed by the formation of a government. This Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15. In the Russian zone, as an outgrowth of the Peoples' Interim Committee formed at the time of liberation, there had been set up a North Korean Peoples' Committee which administered the area under Russian supervision. On August 25, elections were held in north Korea, and reportedly in the underground in south Korea, for a new Supreme National Assembly of Korea. This assembly was to form the Korean Peoples' Republic. Thus today two governments, claiming jurisdiction over all of Korea, are operating on each side of the 38th parallel.[6] The United Nations Commission was scheduled to report to the General Assembly in Paris, and the question of the unification of Korea may have come up for renewed discussion by this time. However, it appears that a stalemate has been reached and the 38th parallel will continue to garrote the economic, social and political life of Korea.

[6] There has been a great deal of material published concerning political affairs in Korea. For a recent summary see the article by my brother George M. McCune, "The Korean Situation," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XVII, No. 17 (Sept. 8, 1948), pp. 197-202. The State Department has just issued a worthwhile report which includes much valuable data and documentary appendices. See *Korea, 1945 to 1948*, Department of State Publication 3305, Far Eastern Series 28, Washington, D. C., October, 1948.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Functioning of the Boundary

Since the liberation of Korea the boundary has functioned as a rigid barrier. The line has been physically marked where major communication lines cross it. There have been a few misinterpretations of maps so that the line has wavered occasionally. On their side the Russians have set up "road blocks" on virtually all the roads and trails. The U. S. Army has established "check points" usually as much as three miles back of the boundary. In the north rather crude fortifications have been constructed in some places along the parallel. However, in part because of the diversity of the land through which the parallel goes, a clandestine movement of persons and goods has been going on. Officially-condoned movement across the line has been much circumscribed.

The major exchange of an economic character has been electric power from the north for electrical equipment, varied manufactured goods, and some raw materials from the south, coming for the most part from Japan and the United States. However, in the spring of 1948 this was stopped, in part as a propaganda gesture. The Russian officials insisted that exchanges be worked out between the American military government and the Soviet-sponsored Korean regime. Since this would have practically amounted to the recognition of such a regime, the Americans refused to negotiate and the Russians cut off the power. There has been a tremendous influx of refugees from the north into the south. Korean estimates are as high as four million persons. They were drawn by a greater abundance of food and conditions considered more favorable to many liberty-loving and independent-minded Koreans. There has been some reverse movement, but it has been much smaller.

The regimes on each side of the boundary are not in a very favorable position to exert strong military pressure on each other at present. Both are concerned with the problems of internal control, reconstruction and development. The evacuation of the Japanese has left many gaps in the administrative hierarchy in all phases of political and economic life. The organizations for law and order and defense are especially

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weak for the Japanese did not trust many Koreans in these phases of government. Thus the present effective armed forces which could carry on offensive action are neither great in number nor high in caliber of leadership. However, danger lies in the fact that in such a situation only a relatively small but well equipped and manned group could surge to power quickly. Present estimates of military man-power are not too firm; there are said to be 125,000 men under arms in the north, backed by an organized peoples' militia. In the south the Korean constabulary is roughly half as large, though it is backed by a Korean youth movement, formed somewhat on German lines, with a reported membership of 1,250,000. If open warfare should break out, most Koreans expect that Soviet and American troops would shortly enter the conflict. The Russians have announced the withdrawal of their forces from Korea, but they have troops stationed in the adjacent Vladivostok area. The Korean government in the south has requested that American troops remain until their defense forces can be well organized.

Of greater importance, therefore, is some judgment of the military and economic power of the two areas. This is difficult to assess. In terms of numbers of people and of agricultural production, south Korea is much the stronger. In terms of exploitable mineral and hydro-electric resources, north Korea has an advantage. Within Japan's war economy Korea was largely a supplier of raw materials—rice, fish, iron ore, coal and metals, and such semi-finished goods as pig iron and steel, aluminum and magnesium, chemicals and explosives. There were some manufacturing and assembly plants but in general the Korean economy was not a self-sufficient unit for war production. Consequently, much development will have to take place in both areas before either can become a self-contained economic power. Even so, with the preponderantly peasant agricultural base and rapidly increasing population, with consequent low living standards, they will not achieve very great economic strength. Their economic ills are grievous, especially in view of the division of the country by the 38th parallel. It seems doubtful, therefore, that either area could mount a sufficiently powerful offensive to conquer the opposing area without

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outside aid. As a consequence, both count upon foreign help to bolster their economies and safeguard their military positions either directly or indirectly. They are hesitant to embark on any determined action against the opposing group which would result in strong military intervention by an outside power. However, each will probably continue subversive activities designed to undermine the power of the other. Chaos appears inevitable as long as the 38th parallel remains as a strongly maintained barrier.

Conclusion

Thus, the early hopes have been dashed that the 38th parallel would only be a loose dividing line between Russian and American troops during a short interim period while the Koreans started on the road to independence, perhaps with some form of international aid. However, Koreans are taking a more active role in the governments organized on each side. Perhaps in time these Koreans, guided by strong nationalistic tendencies and by significant economic necessities, will be able to act together to lessen the rigidity of the barrier. For the time being the prospects for such fusion are not bright, especially so long as severe tension exists between the United States and the U. S. S. R. The present Korean leaders do not appear to be free to act independently, nor are they especially prone to compromise. Therefore, the 38th parallel, originating as a hasty military expedient and functioning as a rigid barrier despite its handicaps as a natural boundary, will probably continue as a critical boundary where friction exists, and where a serious world struggle might be precipitated at any time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEW ARTICLES

WHAT MANNER OF UNION?

By KLAUS KNORR

Barbara Ward, *The West At Bay,* New York, W. W. Norton, 1948, pp. viii, 288. $3.50.
Geoffrey Crowther, *The Economic Reconstruction of Europe,* Claremont, California, Claremont College, 1948, pp. ix, 79. $2.75.
Labour Party, *Feet on the Ground, A Study of Western Union,* London, British Labour Party, 1948, pp. 23.

GIVEN the present weakness of western Europe and the absence of collective security on a broad scale, the demand for Western Union is a natural response to an acute challenge. Whether this response will mature into adequate action, however, cannot be predicted now. One may be optimistic or pessimistic but one cannot be sure. To assert that western Europeans can readily unite if only they put their minds to it is as lacking in insight as to assert that the idea of union is nothing but ephemeral delusion or a cynical pretense calculated to wheedle dollars from a gullible Congress. Americans of either disposition are likely to find these three British publications disturbing and enlightening. They are written by authors who are neither dreamers nor cynics and who offer penetrating analyses of the ways to union and of the pitfalls along the way.

Much of the uncertainty about the future of Western Union reflects the vagueness of the concept of union and the absence of precise criteria with which to measure the adequacy of different degrees and kinds of union that may be contemplated or achieved. The studies under review do not go far to clarify our concepts. They conceive of union as an integration of national efforts transcending an alliance in extent and degree but falling short of federation. Only Mr. Healey's analysis—he is the author of *Feet on the Ground*—mentions alliance as a theoretical alternative to union but dismisses it forthwith

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as undependable and too limited in scope. For the foreseeable future, all three authors deem federation politically unattainable. Indeed, Mr. Healey believes that the purposes of unification could be served better by union than by a federal government which, could it be established at all, "would find itself hedged in at every turn by immovable constitutional obstructions" (p. 20). This is plausible if one thinks of "federation" not as a merger of sovereign powers but as a type of constitution designed to set severe limits to such a merger and hence to the integration of efforts which western Europe is said to require. Mr. Healey and Miss Ward hint that the approach to union as a formal constitutional problem will insure narrow legal restrictions on the real fusion of authority and power, that—over a wide range of state functions—such fusion can be better accomplished without posing the question of sovereignty, that this question, in other words, is best by-passed. The formal approach thus yields to the "functional approach" which is congenial to British dispositions and is in fact pursued by Mr. Bevin who advocates "the principle of an unwritten constitution" for western Europe. In Mr. Healey's words, the emphasis is on "an undefined and flexible association."

Is it conceivable that several sovereign states will integrate their policies, and hence their economic life and their defense establishments, to a point where power is actually fused without the constitutional problem ever having been posed? This could happen once the individual states found it impossible or extremely difficult to extricate themselves from the "union" because their capacity for independent action—their capacity for withdrawal—had become seriously impaired. Such a development is conceivable; but this is not, of course, to say that it is probable and none of the writers reviewed explicitly makes such a claim. In fact, one will expect the prospective participants in Western Union to be very cautious about reducing their capacity for independent existence. They are unlikely to lose this capacity unawares. As long as pressure groups are nationally organized, those groups affected unfavorably by a growing integration would certainly not let it take place unnoticed. Nor will any nation knowingly relinquish its capacity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for independent existence unless its people are overwhelmingly confident that an indissoluble union is actually in the making and that membership in it will be to their interest. In the field of defense, for example, no country will compromise its capacity for independent action unless it has absolute confidence in the united effort.

Applying as the test the capacity for withdrawal, it is possible to classify different forms of cooperation into those less likely to prove feasible because they seriously diminish this capacity, and those that are more practicable precisely because they appear to leave this capacity essentially intact. To the former category belongs cooperation that involves a division of labor or functions cutting across national boundaries. Thus states will agree more readily to pool military forces in a manner that leaves them withdrawable and, if withdrawn, constituting a relatively balanced force. States will hesitate, as long as a choice exists, to become overly dependent upon foreign sources of important and not easily stockpiled matériel. Similarly, in the economic field, states will be reluctant to form an economic union because this merger would reduce the nation's capacity for independent action in many policy fields. Given the modern interventionist economies in western Europe, economic union could be established only if these nations retreated to a predominantly free-market economy (which as a group they are scarcely willing to do), or if they centralized their economic planning and controls, which would presuppose a very close political union. In the economic field, indeed, economic union is the counterpart to federal union in the political field. By contrast, it is more likely that states will coordinate national controls over international trade, capital movements, foreign-exchange rates, fiscal policy, etc., precisely because national controls, including control bureaucracies, remain intact and control policy therefore can be readily revised and a withdrawal from coordination executed.

In general, it can also be assumed that programs of unification seriously impairing a state's capacity for independent existence—programs, in other words, that propound a complex division of labor and functions across national bounda-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ries—will meet with strong resistance because they involve large-scale structural changes in the framework of economic and political activities and hence impose painful burdens of adjustment and a great measure of uncertainty and insecurity during the transition period. The interest-groups upon which these burdens primarily fall will find it convenient and effective to appeal to nationalist symbols in their resistance. "Why die for Danzig?"

It goes without saying that, as long as the western European nations are unwilling to impair their capacity for withdrawal from such a union, withdrawal of any one will remain a constant possibility. Union, built like an alliance on limited commitments, might easily prove undependable in a time of crisis. It would not be an institution which would either compel or merit ultimate confidence.

Even so, such a limited union offers wide scope for useful collaboration as long as its members recognize a wide community of interest. Whatever the level of sacrifice which western European nations are willing to maintain for military purposes, their aggregate capacity for defense can be greatly enhanced by the elaboration of common strategic plans, the execution of joint maneuvers, and the standardization of equipment. In the economic field, much can be gained by coordinating investments in colonial Africa or by husbanding scarce dollars according to a joint plan. But it is also obvious that such integration of efforts, short of irrevocable commitments, may not be forthcoming. No matter what concrete plan is studied, the difficulties involved are striking. A common plan for defense requires agreement—between France and Britain, for instance—on how and where western Europe is to be defended in the event of war. A common dollar pool, as advocated by Miss Ward, presupposes agreement on how to ration precious dollars between the member countries.

It may be contended that a union of limited commitments will necessarily be a weak union and incapable of improving the economic and power position of western Europe in the world. This is perfectly true in the sense that such a union remains subject to the possible defection of its members. Threats or blandishments from the outside will obviously pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vide a real test of the will to union. But whether the capacity for withdrawal will be exercised freely or sparingly is precisely what we do not and cannot know at this time. It is an historical fact that mere alliances have often stood this test successfully and served their purpose well. How susceptible to external threats and blandishments the individual members of a Western Union are, will depend in no small measure on the degree of security and prosperity which western Europe will achieve.

This statement is not entirely begging the question, for union in itself, whether loose or tight, can make no more than a limited contribution to the region's economic and military viability. This is indeed a point that has received little attenton and, beyond a few hints, is not discussed by either Mr. Healey or Miss Ward but is stressed by Mr. Crowther. Clearly, even if western Europe were to reconstitute itself as a single unitary state, it would not thereby automatically experience an increase in its defensive capacity or a balance in its external accounts. Nor would it necessarily do so even in the longer run. Union may be a necessary condition of economic recovery and strength but it is far from a sufficient condition.

The key to the region's economic and military recovery, which may be defined as its ability to afford a politically acceptable standard of living while becoming independent of American aid and allocating the manpower and resources necessary for adequate defense, lies in what will happen to western Europe's capacity to produce. This capacity must be greatly expanded and, in the process of expansion, it must be adapted to the marked changes that have occurred and are occurring in the foreign as well as internal demand for the region's goods and services.

The long-run needs of reducing the current import surplus, of releasing further resources for defense, and—above all—of accelerating capital formation can be satisfied only if consumption levels are kept low through savings and taxation. Are western Europeans in general prepared to make these consumption sacrifices? Are they willing to lower their expectations as regards current living standards in exchange for improved long-run expectations of security, independence, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plenty? These are the decisive questions, and union is no substitute for the sacrifices required. At best union can promise that the sacrifices made will yield the maximum benefit. Union can serve to prevent duplication of effort and, within limits, it can facilitate additions to the region's productive equipment of the right kind and in the right location. That is the chief contribution which a limited union can make.

It is possible that the sacrifices required could be elicited more readily if the symbol of Western Union were used to reinforce those of the nation-state. Nowhere in western Europe has public opinion been sufficiently tested to allow any prediction on this matter. But if Western Union could be and were made a popular cause of the intensity required, the problem of union would have changed its nature, for the functional approach is essentially undramatic and without glamor. If sentiment for union became popular, the movement would almost certainly be transformed into a movement for federation.

In any event, the degree to which western Europe will recover from its present debility will vary in direct proportion to its willingness to release substantial resources from making consumption goods and commit these resources to the increase of its economic and military capacity. But at any given level of effort in this direction, union will tend to augment the accruing gain, and the closer the union the greater will be the increment.

One important question is whether the governments of the western European states will take deliberate steps to increase capital formation and channel it in the right direction and whether they will do so in concert. Joint development is recommended in the publications under review. Mr. Healey proposes that the union plan to add to existing capacity in such major industries as coal, iron and steel, engineering, and chemicals. "For example, a country may be asked to forego some new enterprise because Europe as a whole would benefit more if it were begun elsewhere. Or a country may be asked to develop a promising new industry which it would not otherwise have started, because Europe needs its products" (p. 10). Miss Ward advocates the establishment of western European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corporations in these key industries (pp. 217-226). Simple as these suggestions seem to be, they pose very complex problems of adjustment and if the western European nations follow this advice they will have taken a big step toward a very close union. For a government to participate in such a program, it must commit itself to a certain amount and a definite kind of capital investment and it cannot undertake such a commitment unless it is ready to practice the degree of economic planning required. In principle, this type of cooperation is suited to the policies and powers of the present British government. But on the continent, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, the current trend is away from central planning, and the Belgian government certainly is at present in no position to give or honor such a pledge. Will the majority of the Belgian people change their attitude on government planning in order to accommodate Western Union? If this question is raised, the issue of union is identified with the issue of basic economic organization, with the opponents and proponents of central planning tending to take opposite stands on the question of union.

Even if all nations were ready to institute the degree of central planning required, they would not find it easy to agree on the proper location of additional industrial capacity. Considerations of prestige, military preparedness, and political reliability will enter into the picture. Whatever compromise settlements are evolved may be very far from a plan based on economic efficiency and will curtail greatly the benefits which joint industrial development projects may be expected to confer. Will France agree to cut its ambitious plan for making steel and tractors in order to see steel-making capacity expanded in the Ruhr basin and tractor manufacture in England? Or, given the low capacity of France for executing economic plans, will the other nations trust the French government to live up to its commitments? Since the extended division of labor inherent in joint development makes the various countries more dependent upon each other than before, will they feel sure of receiving the steel or fertilizer supplies they may want even if other countries increase their steel and fertilizer outputs as planned? This would be no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem were western European countries to return to a system of relatively free trade at least among themselves. In that event, each country could bid in the market for the supplies it required. But will the price mechanism be allowed to determine the distribution of key products when they are scarce? Mr. Healey has recognized this problem: "the conflict of interest between the states concerned may prove damaging unless some technique can be found which ensures that the products of development due to collective planning are available equally to all concerned according to need, irrespective of the country in whose territory the development is located" (p. 20). But what is equal availability? Is there any objective criterion on the basis of which the "needs" of different countries can be measured and compared? And what happens if need conflicts with ability to pay?

This example of joint industrial development has been selected not only because it is accorded prominence in the publications here under review but also because it illustrates the various difficulties which are inherent in any *constructive* integration of efforts between modern nations. Upon coordinating highly *restrictive* measures against the outside world—for example, against dollar imports—these countries may be able to agree with relative ease. But any type of constructive cooperation that will improve more than negligibly the basic position of western Europe is bound to hurt, to provoke opposition and disagreement, and to create baffling problems of administration. It is indeed the chief weakness of the books under review that, while making sweeping constructive proposals, they do not elaborate the difficulties involved. Miss Ward, for instance, advocates cross-national corporations for the key industries and she only slights these difficulties by pointing to examples of organized wartime organizations and to the International Steel Cartel with the inference that what has been done successfully before can be done again. But are the Combined Boards and the Middle East Supply Center really relevant models for the kind of integration she is proposing for Western Union?

The wartime agencies mentioned operated with success and their record no doubt calls for careful study. But so does the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

applicability of this experience to the projects proposed by Miss Ward. Surely, to allocate scarce materials and shipping space is a simpler job than to determine the output and investment policy of extremely complex and vital industries. Surely, the single-mindedness of purpose inspiring two close allies engaged in total war differs from the diverse motivations—including response to various interest-groups—guiding a group of nations in peacetime. The *Entente Internationale de l'Acier* seems a still more questionable model for intra-European industrial planning. To be sure, this cartel, like many others, demonstrated that corporate enterprise can cooperate across national boundaries. But like others, this cartel was also a highly unstable one as regards operation and membership and did not survive the impact of depression. Its chief purpose, moreover, was the manipulation of profits through restrictive devices, and the history of cartels reveals clearly that collaboration in restriction is far easier to establish and to sustain than collaboration on an expansionist program. It must be expected from the advocates of Western Union that they examine carefully and in detail the problems of integration and demonstrate feasible ways of implementing it. This burden of proof they have not begun to discharge.

Mr. Crowther is at his persuasive best when he exposes the fallacy of supposing that the way to union is via functional economic cooperation, and argues in his turn for the primacy of military union. "I have become convinced in the last few years, in observing how regularly these arguments [for functional economic cooperation] get stopped by national security, that it will not be possible to achieve any very large measure of economic integration in Western Europe until the question of security ceases to be a national one and becomes a European one" (p. 55). Conceding the force of this argument, one feels yet inclined to doubt that *national* considerations of economic preparedness for war will materially decline unless there is *ultimate* confidence in military union. It is in the nature of politics that, regarding such crucial issues, democratic governments can acquire and act upon such confidence only if union is a popular cause, and that means a cause which is sustained less by nice and detailed calculations of gains

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and costs than by a strong faith in the general and perhaps overestimated benefit of integration.

Perhaps Western Union is capable of becoming one of those decisive ideas of which, in his essay on "Nationality," Lord Acton speaks so eloquently: "The pursuit of a remote and ideal object, which captivates the imagination by its splendour and the reason by its simplicity, evokes an energy which would not be inspired by a rational, possible end, limited by many antagonistic claims, and confined to what is reasonable, practicable, and just." But do western Europeans have the nerve to plunge? We do not know.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

METHOD IN THE STUDY OF WAR

By QUINCY WRIGHT

Quincy Wright, *A Study of War,* 2 vols., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942, pp. xxiii, 1552. $15.00.

[Editor's Note:—Professor Wright's monumental work, *A Study of War,* was completed on the eve of American entry into the Second World War and was published in the months following. The Editors of *World Politics* believe it fitting that the author should undertake an evaluation of his work after a seven-year interval during which the greatest war in history reached its climax and was brought to a close. The postwar reader will be grateful for this guide to understanding the end-product of what was perhaps the most ambitious research program on war in the interwar period, the Causes of War project at the University of Chicago.

In preparation for writing his review article, the author remarks: "I renewed acquaintance with *A Study of War,* which appeared six years ago, and looked over some fifty reviews of the book, including one which I wrote myself. I also examined some fifty articles on related subjects which I have published since the book appeared and an equal number of memoranda which I made while serving with the Foreign Economic Administration, the Department of State, or the Nuremberg Tribunal during the years 1943-45."]

I

Since *A Study of War* appeared, the influence of the airplane in augmenting the power of the offensive in war has become clear and the invention of the atomic bomb has accelerated the tendency for war to become unfavorable to the defense and intolerably destructive of civilian life and culture. Both official circles and the public have given intensive consideration to international institutions and procedures for keeping the peace, and the United Nations has been established. Under

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its influence international law and international organization have developed in the direction of outlawing war, eliminating neutrality, and reaching directly to the individual by protecting human rights and punishing inhuman crime. The rule of unanimity in international political institutions has been modified and international executive institutions have, in principle but not in practice, been provided with means of coercion. These developments however, have not kept pace with the need recognized in *A Study of War* for even more effective world organization. There has been no solution of the problem of reconciling the necessity felt by states in a world of power politics to maintain sufficient national power to defend themselves with the necessity felt by an increasing number of people under the new conditions of war and communication to develop world institutions capable of defending all peoples from war. This problem, with which League of Nations statesmen struggled when faced by the rise of the Axis, is no less serious a preoccupation of United Nations statesmen as the world develops a bi-polar struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In spite of these rapidly changing conditions during the turbulent years since *A Study of War* appeared, the analyses elaborated in the volume have usually provided me with a point of departure, whether the problem was to explain events, to interpret law, or to propose policy. The book seldom provided all of the data needed for a particular study and usually the principles or policies set forth in it needed considerable elaboration. In most cases, however, I was able to find in the book distinctions of ideas, enumerations of factors, analyses of situations, and suggestions of relations, which were of use in dealing with particular problems. The book and the intensive thought given to its preparation has provided me with a way to think about war and other problems of international relations, all of which are related to war.

To provide such a guide was in fact, the primary intention of the study. I have, therefore, been surprised to discover how few reviewers have paid much attention to this aspect of the work. They have often considered it an encyclopedia of information, an exposition of principles, or a proposal of policies,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but the points which interested me most, both in writing it and in using it, have generally escaped them. There must have been a fault in the mode of presentation. Perhaps the material presented to illustrate methods of thought was so voluminous as to seem an end in itself and to obscure the organization of the book and the method it was designed to suggest.

It is true that much more of the book is devoted to facts, hypotheses, and policies than to methods. *A Study of War* is divided into four parts, of which only the introduction, much the briefest part, deals exclusively with method. Part Two, the history of war, sets forth many facts deemed to be relevant. Part Three, the analysis of war, develops propositions and formulae intended to be of predictive value, and Part Four, the control of war, deals with policies for the prevention of war and factors to be considered in the formation of policy. The limited space given to the specific treatment of method was due to the fact that abstract discussions of method seemed to me unilluminating. It occurred to me that methods and modes of thought on the subject could be best set forth by illustrating their application with as much detail as circumstances permitted. Thus, I hoped that the methodological structure would be apparent throughout the whole undertaking.

Although I wanted to present facts I was not greatly interested in their mere accumulation. My principal objective was to show the kind of facts that I thought relevant to a study of war. Statements about war are voluminous, but many relevant facts are difficult to find and even more difficult to verify. I repeatedly emphasized in the text the inadequacy of data about such simple matters as the dating of battles, campaigns, and wars, the determination of the participants, the number of forces involved, and the casualties.[1] The further one gets from contemporary events the more inadequate the data becomes. Perhaps it would have been better, as some reviewers suggested, not to have presented data the accuracy of which could not be guaranteed. However, it seemed to me worthwhile to do the best which I and some sixty research workers who assisted in the study could, in the hope that this indication of the types

[1] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, pp. 102-3; 218, n. 2; 569, 636 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of data which are relevant would stimulate others to hunt further, and perhaps discover better sources.

I also had an interest in developing some propositions and formulae which, if valid, might be useful for the prediction of war, but I tried to make it clear that in most cases the data were insufficient to verify these propositions. The propositions and formulae presented did not claim to be more than hypotheses. My main intention was to illustrate types of variables and relations, the investigation of which might advance the study of war. I hoped that the somewhat elaborate formula derived from consideration of the various types of distances between states[2] and the propositions derived from abstraction of the technical,[3] ideological,[4] sociological,[5] and psychological[6] aspects of war[7] would be viewed as suggestions of methods which might be further investigated, rather than as definitive conclusions.

I made some practical suggestions of policy, but with full realization that in the political field policies can flow only from detailed analysis of an actual situation. Consequently, the proposals made could only be in very general terms without reference to priorities or timing. They were intended to be useful in illustrating a general direction of policy and the classes of factors in an actual situation which should demand attention in deciding upon concrete policies.[8]

> An engineer [I wrote], can produce a blueprint of a bridge with all details described before the work begins. Planning of a social construction in this sense is impossible for two reasons: the objectives may be expected to change with experience and favorable opinion which is the major condition for success can not be predicted far in advance. The social planner is faced by a problem like that of an architect asked to design houses, in accord with specifications which will be changed every week, to be constructed of mud which will wash away with the rain, in a region where a heavy rain is expected every month. Under such conditions, detailed engineering plans would not pay. . . . Symbolic exposition and the actual application of the symbols to the phenomena must proceed together in the process of social synthesis. . . . Social synthesis is, therefore, history in the making.

[2] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 35 and 36. [3] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 12, 20, 21, and 22.
[4] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 13, 23, 24, and 25. [5] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 10, 26, 27, 28, and 29.
[6] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 11, 30, 31, 32, and 33. [7] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 34 and 37.
[8] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 38, 39, and 40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> It is to be written in human behavior and social institutions, not in books. . . . [This, however,] is a problem for statesmen rather than for writers. This section of the book will, therefore, be short.[9]

The manuscript was practically completed a year before Pearl Harbor and published shortly after that event, but the experiences of World War II have not suggested that much modification should be made in the book. I will presently note two issues emphasized by the release of atomic energy that were not adequately treated. But since the book was based on a very broad survey of human and even animal experience, it certainly would have been surprising, and for me disheartening, if the hypotheses suggested had been found wanting soon after they had been formulated.

II

My point of view on how to think about war can perhaps be made clear by comparing it with two other books which emphasize method in social studies. I refer to Gunnar Myrdal's study of the race problem in a book entitled *The American Dilemma,* and Mortimer Adler's book entitled *How to Think About War and Peace*. The first was finished in September 1942 and published in 1943. Since *A Study of War* was published in December 1942, it is clear that neither book influenced the other. Mortimer Adler's book was finished in the summer of 1943 and published in 1944. Mr. Adler gives no direct indication that he had looked at *A Study of War,* although he says his book "is a reaction to other books on the subject."[10]

Although the subject matter of Mr. Myrdal's book was different from *A Study of War* his method was similar. In a recent discussion of his book Mr. Myrdal says his study of the negro problem

> . . . very largely was intended to the raising and formulating of problems to be investigated, to working out the sociological methods to be utilized, and to the providing of useful hypotheses for . . . further researches. . . . Social causation is not to be grasped by the simple metaphor of a chain of causes and effects, but should rather be understood in terms of a system of functional relations between a very

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 1299-1300, 1303-4. [10] P. xxi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great number of interdependent variables. Negatively, this implies that there is no "basic factor" in the causation of a social situation. Economic determinism is not a permitted simplification. . . .

. . . the request upon research is that it should be focused much more definitely upon the dynamics of the . . . problem than it has been. The ideal . . . survey, for instance, would be an analysis of processes being under way much more than simply an account of the facts in a situation. Only by shifting over the entire emphasis to the dynamics of the . . . problem will it be possible for research to meet the needs of the social engineer, the reformer, and the politician, by assisting him in ascertaining the strategic approaches to the practical problems. When the research on [social] problems has . . . largely remained of a rather static and unproblematic character, this has undoubtedly been in line with—but has at the same time been sanctioning—a . . . weakness which [has been] . . . called "the fatalism of the multitude. . . ."

The main facts in this dynamic social process to be studied are not the "real facts" but people's conceptions about them. The "real facts" . . . have relevance for human behavior only through the popular beliefs about those facts. And the beliefs are systematically twisted and mutilated in people's attempts to defend their behavior to the world and, primarily, to themselves, i.e. to conceal or reconcile the conflicts of valuations raging within them. It is in this sense, basically, that a social problem is a moral problem.

People's beliefs about facts are, of course, also facts, and they can be studied by observing their direct and indirect manifestations. The hypothesis, when comparing people's beliefs with true knowledge, should be that ignorance is not a simple question merely of more or less meagre and incorrect knowledge. Ignorance is meaningful; it has a purpose, it is opportune.[11]

My general agreement with the point of view expressed in this passage can be illustrated by the following quotation from *A Study of War:*

Scientific method applied to social activity, which is typically a problem-solving activity, differs, in some respects, from that method applied to physical phenomena and yields results which are much less precise. . . . The presence of contingency, of purpose, of universal change, and of universal interrelatedness, flowing from the number, subjectivity, instability, complexity, and problematic character of the factors involved, renders the application of scientific method to human and social problems exceptionally difficult and frequently unproductive. . . .

[11] Gunnar Myrdal, "Social Trends in America and Strategic Approaches to the Negro Problem," *Phylon*, Vol. IX, No. 3 (1948), pp. 211-12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The social scientist must create a structure of assumptions and use a language which is at the same time symbolic and emotive. . . . [He] must recognize that wishes, opinions, and beliefs, including his own, are among the phenomena with which he deals. He cannot exclude them from his predictive formulations as may the physicist. With all their intangibility, imponderability, and changeability, he must do his best to reduce them to order. He cannot do this unless he combines persuasion with analysis. He must try to perpetuate in the society the beliefs which constitute the postulates of his study, or his analysis will be undermined.[12]

In contrast to these expositions of scientific method applied to social problems Mortimer Adler treats the problem of war and peace as largely one of definition and inference, although he does refer casually to the need of historical verification. His method is to sum up the position of pessimists and optimists on the problem of perpetual peace which he identifies with world government. He presents the predictions, goals, and means of each party, illustrated by selected writings, and urges the reader to take one side or the other, after weighing the arguments of each. He then defines peace and war and from his definition concludes: "The cause of peace is government."[13] "The only cause of war is anarchy."[14] These propositions are not demonstrated but are inferred from definitions. Peace is defined as the condition within a political community, and war is defined as the relation between independent political communities.

Adler recognizes that there may be "civil war," but, since it occurs within a political community, he describes it as "potential peace." He also recognizes that there may be, for periods of time, an absence of fighting between distinct political communities but, in accordance with his definition of war, he prefers to call such periods truces or "potential war." It is clear that with these definitions and with the added inference that community implies government, world peace can be defined as world government and war can be defined as an absence of world government. Are these definitions really adequate?

[12] Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 682-4. See also pp. 1085, 1087, 1115-17, 1299, 1355 ff.

[13] Mortimer Adler, *How to Think about War and Peace*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1944, p. 55.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the century between Waterloo and the Marne, more people were killed in such instances of "potential peace" as the T'aip'ing Rebellion, and the American Civil War than in all the "wars" of that century combined. If one were to accept different definitions one might by this method reach very different conclusions. Suppose, for instance, peace is defined as the absence of active fighting and war as active fighting. One might then conclude that one cause of peace is distance between communities. With this definition, civil wars which have probably killed more people than international wars, could not be dismissed as "potential peace." It might with these definitions even be suggested that one cause of war is too much government, since that has frequently contributed to revolts and insurrections leading to civil war. In saying this, I do not wish to deny that the distinction between a society's use of force to maintain law among its members and to maintain policy against other societies may be useful even though both operations may sometimes involve large scale hostilities.

Much of Mr. Adler's argument is persuasive, and I agree with some of his conclusions, but I think his book illustrates "how not to think about war." His emphasis upon a single cause of war, his confidence that something can be learned from definitions beyond what is put into them, his positing of inexorable alternatives, his preference for qualitative rather than quantitative distinctions, and in general his preference for concepts and analyses shaped to the simplicity of the human mind rather than to the complexity of the phenomena dealt with, constitute, I think, a method unsuited to the prediction or control of social phenomena.

III

The theses set forth in *A Study of War* which seem to me of main methodological importance are the following:

1. *Pluralism*—there is no single cause of war. Wars arise from the interaction of many factors—technological, ideological, sociological, and psychological—the relative importance of which varies in history. The search for a single germ or cause of war mistakes the nature of war and the nature of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social causation. Social phenomena always arise from complex situations.[15]

2. *Quantitative concepts*—the factors, the interaction of which accounts for war, should be treated as far as possible, as quantitative variables. Significant propositions refer to the influence of degrees and rates of change in one variable upon degrees and rates of change in another. To say that world government is the cause of peace and the absence of world government is the cause of war means nothing. To say that under present conditions more government of the world and less government of some national states would decrease the probability of war is, if provable, a significant proposition. It can be elaborated into a proposition of precise control value in proportion as analysis of the significant elements in the present situation and measurement of the quantity of government in a society becomes possible.[16]

3. *Relativity*—social objectives emphasized by the "idealist" and social conditions emphasized by the "realist" must both be considered in formulating propositions intended to have predictive or control value concerning war. Propositions in social science are to be verified on the one hand by their consistency with observations of social phenomena of the past and present, and on the other by their persuasiveness upon opinion in the present and future. Human behavior is influenced by both inertia and aspirations, so neither the "realistic" nor the "idealistic" approach can be ignored. Consequently, social questions can only be answered in terms of probability and within defined limits of time and space. Questions in absolute terms cannot be answered, and should not be asked. If the human race should become a single group with an accepted hierarchy of values, and if men should acquire a perfect understanding of conditions so that there would be agreement on the means appropriate to the realization of these values, then there would be no wars. Social action would consist of the administration of methods to achieve accepted ends. But, in fact, the conditions which have been characteristic of human groups in the past—conflicting ends, and disagreement about the

[15] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 1284.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 731 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means for the achievement of even common ends—will be important as long as man remains a problem-solving animal whose future behavior is not completely determined and cannot be wholly predetermined. Perhaps progress requires that man should so remain.[17]

4. *Opinions*—the objectives of a group are determined by the evaluative opinions prevalent in that group. Opinions about conditions are therefore more significant than the conditions themselves in determining group action. The progress from animals through primitive societies to civilized societies is manifested by an increasing opportunity to make choices of alternative policies and by an increasing influence of conscious adaptation of means to ends, and consequently, by an increasing relative importance of social objectives. As a result, group opinions are, and are likely to remain, the most significant facts to study in the social sciences, and notably in the study of war. Opinions are influenced by education and propaganda; therefore scientific formulations are dependent upon, and at the same time influence, movements of opinion. Thus, the dichotomy between science and art is less possible in the social field than in the field of non-human phenomena.[18]

5. *Processes and Relations*—Society may be analyzed in terms of entities, processes, forces, and relations. The progress of social science, as indeed of natural science, may be measured by the degree of its emphasis upon processes and relations rather than upon entities and forces.[19]

In accordance with these methodological theses, *A Study of War* attempts to formulate definitions, to describe processes, to measure variables, and to suggest relations which are susceptible of verification by data of the past, and which may serve to predict or influence the future.[20]

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 1207 ff., 1227 ff., 1235 ff. [18] *Ibid.*, pp. 1084-1117.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 1432 ff. See also p. 1012 ff. Closely related is the distinction between techniques, functions, drives and theories (p. 18) utilized in the historical chapters; the distinction between government, nation, people, and state (p. 19) utilized in the analytical parts; and the distinction between the military, sociological, psychological, and legal points of view (p. 20) utilized in Appendix 3 and Chapter 34. The concept of relations between measurable variables is especially utilized in Chapters 35 and 36.

[20] The scientific, historical and practical causes of war are summarized on p. 731 ff., and the concepts and causes of war from the voluntaristic and deterministic points of view are summarized on p. 1235 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

Among the hypotheses suggested with preliminary attempts at verification the following may be noted:

(1) Variability of war. The frequency and gravity of wars have varied greatly in time and place, suggesting that its incidence and character are influenced less by persistent factors such as "human nature" than by sporadic factors such as social organization, group opinions, technological conditions, or constellations of relations among these factors.[21]

(2) Distance between groups. The various aspects of distance (technological, ideological, sociological, and psychological) between particular pairs of states or between states in general are susceptible of measurement and the relations between the rates of change of these distances is correlated with the probability of war.[22]

(3) Political lag. In particular the lag of the regulative influence of political organization behind the interdependence caused by technological progress results in a cumulative gap between the moral world of justice administered by the overall group and the material world of self-help exercised by its component groups. When it passes a certain threshold, this gap is manifested by protracted and intense intergroup war. On the other hand, the accommodating influence of common values may lag behind the centralizing influence of common political organization, resulting in a cumulative gap between the coercion of government and the consent of the governed and leading to periods of prolonged and violent civil war. From the political point of view, the problem of peace in a civilization is therefore one of maintaining the precise degree of centralization of government over the whole, adapted from both the regulative and the educative point of view to the degree of social solidarity among the parts.[23]

(4) Ideological gaps. Group objectives tend to be influenced on the one hand by opinions about values stemming from traditions and, on the other hand, by opinions about the order of the universe, looking toward the potentialities of the future.

[21] Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 372 ff.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 1240 ff., 1276 ff. [23] *Ibid.*, p. 1284 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As a consequence, with the cumulative progress of science developing new potentialities of human value and action, a widening gap develops between traditionalists and radicals leading to periods of frequent war. Thus, from the educational point of view, the problem of peace is that of continually synthesizing old values derived from cultural traditions with new values derived from the increased opportunities offered by scientific progress.[24]

(5) Change and stability. Changes in technology, in ideology, in institutions, and in opinions always occur in human groups, but become more rapid with the advance of societies from the primitive rule of custom, magic, and authority, to the modern rule of propaganda, science, and legislation. So the problem of reconciling the *status quo* and change assumes an increasing importance in the causation of war. The solution involves an analysis of the aspects of society, measurement of the rates of change, and determination of the influence of these rates upon one another. At a given time, it may be desirable that some aspects of society be kept constant and others permitted to change freely. This hypothesis if verified, may constitute a guide in selecting the aspects of society where stability, and those where freedom, is desirable.[25]

V

A Study of War makes practical short-run suggestions for dealing with aggressive governments, international feuds, crisis periods, and incipient wars,[26] and in the long run for building up the investigatory and educational competence of international institutions, for maintaining a proper balance between international legal and political jurisdictions, for organizing and limiting executive and legislative powers of the world community, for appropriately allocating regional and universal responsibilities, for providing a suitable system of world representation, for effectively punishing world crimes, for stimulating a sense of world citizenship, and for developing world welfare.[27] These suggestions look forward toward an increase in the centralization and effectiveness of international government, but with

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 402 ff. [25] *Ibid.*, pp. 380 ff., 955, 1277 ff., 1338 ff.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 1326 ff. [27] *Ibid.*, p. 1334 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

warning that the process may go too far and too fast. Maintenance of general consent to world institutions is also a value. The various aspects of the world community—the degree of communication and contact among its peoples, the degree of the solidarity of opinion concerning common policies and objectives, the degree of harmony among its value systems, and the degree of centralization of its organization—must be developed synchronously in relation to one another.[28]

Maintenance of the general form of stability in the world at a given time may require policies different from or even inconsistent with those required to maintain another and perhaps, under changing conditions, preferable, form of stability. Thus policies appropriate to a stable equilibrium of power may not be appropriate to a stable regime of world law.[29] The problem of transition from one form of stability to another therefore offers problems of peculiar difficulty. I do not think I dealt with this problem entirely satisfactorily in the book. There are certain inconsistencies in the discussion of the questions whether change from stability by power equilibrium to stability by a world law is possible or under existing conditions desirable, and whether, if desirable, that change should be effected suddenly or gradually.[30]

Uncertainty on this point probably arose because I could not make up my mind whether the changing technology of war favored the offensive or the defensive.[31] If it favored the defensive, a moderate degree of stability by balance of power would not be impracticable, and opinion could not easily be moved to accept the qualifications of national sovereignty which are necessary for stability by world law. The development of bombing aircraft and the invention of the atom bomb has shifted the advantage clearly to the offensive and, in my judgment, has made protracted stability by balance of power impossible. The emergence of the two-power world through the strengthening of the United States and the Soviet Union, the weakening of Britain and France, and the destruction of Germany, Italy and

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 975 ff., 1332 ff. [29] *Ibid.*, p. 1493 ff.

[30] The need of sudden change is emphasized on pp. 937, 1345, and 1497, but the probability that such change will involve war and the virtue of gradualness are emphasized on pp. 1040, 1236, and 1306. Carl J. Friedrich comments on this point in his understanding review in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4 (January 1943), pp. 508-11.

[31] Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan has added to the difficulty of maintaining a stable equilibrium of power. Consequently, both the probability and the desirability of the transition to stability through world law has increased, but at the same time the achievement of that transition peacefully has become more difficult.[32]

While sudden achievement of that change could hardly be effected without a considerable degree of coercion which might involve an atomic war, a gradual change may be impossible because states will not sacrifice their capacity to defend themselves until they are reasonably certain that the world government can defend them. The issue has been emphasized in the controversy over international control of atomic energy. The problem of the time schedule for outlawry of atomic war, destruction of existing stocks, agreement on a system of control, and effective operation of such a system, have produced an impasse. These steps must, it would seem, be accomplished all at once, but the United States will not sacrifice its stocks of bombs until the system of international control has proved effective, and the Soviet Union will not permit international inspection and control of atomic operations in its territory until it is certain that the United States has actually destroyed its stocks of bombs. There are, of course, other points of difference.

The book does not deal adequately with the problems of suddenness and gradualness, and I do not yet know how they should be approached. Perhaps the solution lies in a more refined analysis to determine the minimum of control that must be accomplished suddenly and upon which agreement might be possible, leaving other aspects to gradual change. If such an analysis fails to be achieved and to result in effective action, sudden change through war and conquest may be the consequence resulting in world government not by voluntary federation, but by empire of the victor. This dichotomy, however, between the two forms of world government should not be considered absolute. The transition from power equilibrium to world government able to maintain world law, if effected, would probably involve some coercion and some consent. The problem is to maximize the consent and minimize the coercion.[33]

[32] On the whole the book considered this transition necessary.

[33] Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 938. I dealt with this problem in an article entitled "Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 55, No. 5 (August 1946), pp. 870-884.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

By JACOB J. KAPLAN

Fairfield Osborn, *Our Plundered Planet,* Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1948, pp. xiv, 217. $2.50.
William Vogt, *Road to Survival,* New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948, pp. xvi, 335. $4.00.

THE twin facts that the world's population is constantly increasing and that its physical resources are constantly being consumed have been subjected to persistent rediscovery at least since the days of that "dismal scientist," Malthus. Whether the cause be the current high price of food in the United States, economic *malaise* in Europe, or widespread pessimism engendered by the persistence of international crisis, a new wave of concern about the pressure of an increasing population upon the earth's "dwindling" resources has recently engulfed us. Two books on the subject are currently enjoying wide circulation, and the 1948 meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the *New York Herald Tribune* Forum provided platforms for further cries of alarm.

The essential purposes of Messrs. Osborn, Vogt, *et al.,* may be summarized in a quotation from Mr. Vogt.

> Renewable resources [must] be used to produce as much wealth as possible on a sustained-yield basis. We must use these resources well to support as high a living standard as possible; and we must not exhaust them, as there is no substitute. . . . We must adjust our demand to the supply, either by accepting less per capita (lowering our living standard) or by maintaining less people. Since our civilization cannot survive a *drastic* lowering of standards, we cannot escape the need for population cuts.[1]

With the daily news dominated by international crisis and with the United States becoming increasingly conscious of its new role as a responsible world power, it is inevitable that the

[1] *Road to Survival,* p. 265.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significance of this problem for United States foreign policy should also come into question. Indeed, as the advocates of conservation and population limitation survey the problem from continent to continent, they wonder aloud concerning numerous foreign policy questions which grow out of their analyses. Can the Greek aid program succeed without a "long term program of land resource betterment" (Osborn) and without "reduced breeding of Greeks" (Vogt)? American aid to Europe should be contingent on "freedom of contraception" and should include "educational and functional contraceptive material" (Vogt). A heavily industrialized India or China might endanger world peace if their governments aggressively sought emigration opportunities for their people. Soviet population policy is based on a "Micawber-like faith in technology." "If this faith were disappointed and a long period of drought occurred, population pressure might lead to a program of world conquest.

We must first ask whether the considerations presented in the current discussions are adequate for long range policy planning either in the domestic or foreign field. I fear that the answer must be in the negative. It must be negative because population and resources alone are not the only elements which determine even the rate of exhaustion of a strategic raw material, let alone the prospect for economic development or rising standards of living. Presumably, it is toward such policy problems that the conservationists direct themselves.

The problem basic to human prosperity involves the need for maintaining an increasing real national income. That and the problem of maintaining such an increase with a minimum of cyclical fluctuation must be solved to provide the economic basis for political stability.

National income is not determined solely by the quantities of all factors of production available to the economy in question; the effectiveness with which these factors are used is at least as important. Natural resources form only one group of productive factors; labor is another, machinery and equipment form a third. People, to be sure, consume natural resources; but they may also convert natural resources into capital goods which increase the productivity of the natural resources taken into the production process at a later date. So

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long as an economy is adding to its per capita stock of production capital, it is capable of producing an increasing real national income. Included in an economy's production capital are the skills and technological ability of both labor and management as well as the machinery and natural resources available. The size of the *total* is significant, not the size of any constituent part. A reduction in the stock of one element that makes possible a greater increase in another must be reckoned as a net gain.

The neo-conservationists either do not consider or will not accept the possibility of substituting one kind of productive factor for another. They point out that the world's population has been growing at a very rapid rate during the past hundred years. In many parts of the world existing methods of cultivation are leading to extensive soil erosion. Forests are being cut down faster than they are replaced by new growth. Minerals are being mined at a rate far in excess of their replacement by geologic processes. Obviously, this process must end in disaster, they say.

The innocent bystander may suggest that although this process has been going on for years in western Europe and the United States, the standard of living has been rising. Why must it inevitably fall in the future unless these tendencies are reversed?

Conservationist attacks on this line of approach take various forms. They assert that the rising standard of living of the nineteenth century was based on the spread of population to new lands which were then ruthlessly exploited and despoiled. The prospects for expanding the world's arable acreage are now quite limited; the cost would be almost prohibitive and the areas available are undesirable for human habitation.

We are told further that part of the increase was the result of tremendous strides in technology, but that we cannot expect this to continue indefinitely. Mr. Osborn points to the limitations of soil science. (The failure to consider the potential contributions of recent developments in plant genetics to increased agricultural production is a notable omission in the current discussions.) Nevertheless, comparative statistics suggest that a tremendous increase in both agricultural and in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dustrial production would be possible if the best techniques now known were universally applied.[2]

Moreover, there is certainly more reason to believe that scientific progress will continue than that it has reached its limits. Recent history certainly suggests that, technologically speaking, it is possible to develop substitute materials in order to meet specified needs. The problems involved are two-fold: First, is the new process worth the research investment required? And second are the production costs of the new materials prohibitive by comparison with the cost of the materials previously employed or the needs met by the raw materials required in their new as compared with their former employment?

The more polemical parts of the two books under discussion alternate between two conflicting lines of attack. The first is a criticism of the pre-eminence of material goods in our scale of values (as represented by the quest for a higher standard of living). The second is a warning that we must anticipate a declining standard of living unless we embark on a large-scale program of resource conservation and limitation of population growth. Indeed, Mr. Vogt ignores all the available statistical indicators and tells us that even in the United States a "lower standard of living is here."

I suspect that it is our value system that is the real object of attack and that the spectre of the inevitable frustration of our chimerical pursuit of a higher standard of living is drawn in order to gain approval of a policy consistent with conservationist ideology. The world of "gadgets and inventions," we are told, is a false one. The high U. S. living standard has given us one of the highest insanity rates in the world. We do not appreciate "the towering of white ibises over the Everglades." We want radios and cities. In the 1930's, agricultural fundamentalists preached the values of the rural life, close to the

[2] For example, in the period 1930 to 1934, an average of 340 million acres of wheat were harvested annually. If world average yields were at the average Belgian level during this period, the total world harvest would have been 2.75 times as large; at the average Japanese level, it would have been almost twice as large; at the average French level, 1.66 times as large. Yield per acre in the United States was only at the then existing world average level. Obviously, even with the state of the science of agriculture fifteen years ago, the existing arable acreage would have produced much more food per acre than it did, if only sufficient capital (fertilizer, equipment, etc.) and labor were applied to that acreage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

soil and replete with the joy of satisfying our daily needs by producing our food, clothing, and shelter with our own hands. Now, Mr. Osborn condemns our urbanization because of its unbalance—organic materials are "consumed or disposed of in urban centers and not returned for the enrichment of the land from which they have been derived."

In essence we have an attack on "anthropocentrism"—on the concept that man is the ultimate end and that nature exists to provide man with an ever-increasing abundance of the things he desires. Mr. Osborn insists that we must re-establish a "balance between man and nature." Speaking at the *Herald Tribune* Forum, he accepts Mr. Vogt's more concrete objective that renewable resources[3] must be used only on a sustained yield basis. Neither asks what the cost of such a program would be in terms of human life or welfare. Perhaps this cost cannot be estimated with any degree of approximation. Should we not question, however, whether the immediate withdrawal of millions of acres of land from arable cultivation might involve widespread starvation in the very next crop-consumption year? Should not one ask whether the cost of reforestation, and soil conservation engineering projects adequate to prevent further depletion of forest and wild-life would exceed total world savings? Would they exceed savings before or after making up for depletion of our other capital resources? Of course, if one's value system condemns doctors and public health workers for prolonging human life because such prolongation leads to increased resource depletion, the above questions are irrelevant. I fear, however, that we confirmed "anthropocentrists" must continue to ask such questions.

There is, of course, a valid case for conservation and population limitation that can be reconciled with an anthropocentric scheme of things. Such a case would run in terms of desired standards of living and the use of available factors of production in as efficient a fashion as possible. I fear that within such a framework, it might be difficult to avoid continued

[3] It may seem curious that non-renewable resources are not mentioned. The obvious explanation is that to include them would sharpen the dilemma between human welfare and absolute conservation. Obviously, a sustained-yield exploitation of our coal or petroleum resources would create havoc in our whole industrial civilization. But why, one feels impelled to ask, should non-renewable resources be subjected to man's rapaciousness?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

depletion of renewable as well as non-renewable natural resources. As we have already pointed out, our basic proposition is that a rising standard of living requires an increasing per capita stock of producers' capital which may in part be made up of increased technological and managerial skills.

A national economy which reduces this per capita supply must either take steps to reduce its population also, or it must face the prospect of a declining standard of living.

It is perfectly possible for an economy to deplete its per capita supply of natural resources without threatening its future standard of living by simultaneously and at least commensurately increasing its per capita supply of other production factors.

The addition of the various elements entering into total production capital must be made by valuing each component in terms of its money price. Prices are the effective expression of the supply of the various factors of production relative to human wants, and to anticipations of future wants. In so far as these prices are distorted by the institutional framework, factors will be incorrectly valued and the determination of the size of the stock of production capital will be distorted. Such distortions may cause natural resources to be undervalued and hence to be consumed at an excessive rate.

The proponent of a government program to promote conservation of natural resources may point to several factors which tend toward undervaluation and hence wasteful use of natural resources. Probably the most important is the discrepancy between individual and social cost accounting. Many individuals are able to avoid bearing part of the social costs of their economic activities.[4] Many of the specific abuses and wastes cited by the conservationists may be included in this category. Lumbermen and sheep-breeders gain access to the public domain without having to bear the full depletion costs. Farmers and lumbermen transfer to the public the expenses of flood control which are necessitated by their exploitation of soil and forest resources. The valid core of the Vogt-Osborn attack on capitalism and the profit motive is based on misuse

[4] For a more complete discussion of the divergence of social and individual costs and their significance for conservation policy see A. C. Bunce, *Economics of Soil Conservation*, Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College Press, 1942.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of resources as a result of such a lack of adequate social accounting.

Inefficient use of resources in general may result from governmental regulations in response to the pressures of special interest groups or private economic groups occupying monopolistic positions. One might argue that the net effect of such influences is particularly wasteful of natural resources.

Finally, one might contend that relative prices are in large part the product of the pattern of income distribution and that this pattern is unjust. A more equitable pattern, it might be argued, would result in a much higher valuation being put on natural resources. This kind of argument, while logically correct once the ethical judgment is accepted, involves such a drastic attack on the institutional environment that its implications for resource conservation are apt to be quite secondary.

So long as a populace feels that its standard of living represents a margin of tolerance, failure to use resources in an optimum fashion is unlikely to be a source of serious social unrest and political instability. And of course, the provision of a standard of living acceptable to the bulk of the population is not the only means by which a governing group may maintain itself in power. However, a society which cannot hold out at least a convincing prospect of a rising standard of living is likely to have a full quota of internal difficulties.

We can examine the implications of the current discussion of population growth and resource conservation for long range U. S. foreign policy formulation by applying some of the principles discussed above. The potential significance of this problem for U. S. foreign policy may be generalized into a series of propositions:

(1) As a major power, the United States is interested in the political stability of friendly countries with political institutions similar to its own. In so far as economic prosperity is vital to the maintenance of a stable political system, its policy planners must be concerned by a rate of resource depletion that might threaten continued prosperity. *A fortiori,* a rate of resource utilization in the United States that threatened its own prosperity would be of even greater significance to its foreign policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) If we are concerned about the maintenance of our world power position, our relations with various countries must be conditioned by their prospects for economic growth as well as by their present power positions. Differential capacities for development of areas of the world with large (or potentially large) population concentrations are important considerations for long-run foreign policy planning. It has become commonplace to point with alarm to the planned rapid rate of development of the Soviet Union. It is equally important to our long range foreign planning to know if China and India are likely to develop in the next fifty years as Japan did between 1890 and 1940.

(3) Population pressure on areas with limited resources may lead to a quest for emigration opportunities that could disrupt world peace. On the other hand, it may so weaken the area that its government becomes incapable of supporting an aggressive foreign policy.

(4) The depletion of supplies of strategic raw materials upon which either we or our potential allies depend would be a development of obvious importance.

In the light of these propositions we need to formulate judgments on as adequate a factual basis as possible concerning the prospective course of economic development of the various areas of the world. Regarding each area, we need to know whether the rate at which additional capital is accumulating is likely to remain in excess of the rate of population growth. The ratio of population to natural resources is only part of that picture. Where there is social unrest because current living standards are unacceptable, we should find out whether the rate at which the per capita stock of capital is growing is likely to produce satisfactory living standards in the foreseeable future. We should ascertain whether the available productive resources are being used as efficiently as possible. Both an adequate system of social accounting for the use of resources and the dissemination of knowledge of the most effective production techniques are essential to the most effective use of resources.

The acceptability of a living standard will depend not only on the size of the national income but also upon the way in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which it is distributed and the kinds of goods it includes. It will also depend on the stability of that income over time—on the amplitude of business cycle fluctuations. The rate of capital accumulation and of growth in national income will be heavily influenced by the confidence of the upper income classes (the principal source of savings) in the security of their investments and by their individual evaluations of the likelihood of a rising national income. Capital accumulation and income growth will also be influenced by the willingness of the state to tax such large incomes and divert the proceeds into productive investment channels when such private evaluations do not result in an adequate rate of investment. The strength of the central government and the realism and effectiveness of its economic policies may thus be of crucial importance.

Such considerations as the foregoing may provide a basis for determining whether current foreign aid programs are likely to provide more than short-run tactical advantages. A proper evaluation of these factors will show whether a given foreign aid program is likely to contribute to a greater productive capacity and hence toward a higher living standard in the area in question. It will indicate the kind of conditions necessary to achieve these objectives and place the importance of foreign material or financial aid in proper perspective relative to the motivation of such aid. Such considerations should also serve as the basis of our estimates of the likely trends in the relative economic power position of the various parts of the world.

We may conclude by reiterating that an effective foreign policy is impossible without continuing domestic prosperity. The considerations we have noted apply at least as forcefully to our own economy. We have undoubtedly been more wasteful of our resources than a rigid system of social accounting and sound public policies would permit. If the current overstatements of the case for resource conservation serve to dramatize the need for a continuing examination of our own productive resources and the efficiency with which they are used in the public interest, a most useful purpose will certainly be served.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RESEARCH NOTES

RUSSIAN RESEARCH AT HARVARD

By CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

THE Russian Research Center was established February 1, 1948. It is supported by the Carnegie Corporation on a grant covering the period until July 1, 1953. The Research Center is an integral part of Harvard University and the senior members of its staff are all members of the Harvard faculty. Although the Center is not directly concerned with instruction, there is close cooperation with the Soviet Program of the Committee on International and Regional Studies, and a number of members of the Center staff teach in this program.

OBJECTIVES

The major objective of the Research Center is the study of Russian institutions and behavior in an effort to determine the mainsprings of the international actions and policy of the Soviet Union. It is also hoped, of course, to make a more general contribution to the scientific and scholarly understanding of the Soviet world and of the contributions of Russian science and to provide the public with carefully evaluated information on this area. The Center is particularly concerned with fields of study which have to date been somewhat neglected. These include sociology, psychology, anthropology, technology, and detailed regional investigations. Another emphasis in the work of the Center is on the coordination of various scholarly approaches in the attack on specific problems. Thus, investigations concerning the Communist Party are being approached not only from the point of view of the political scientist but also from those of the economist, psychologist, and sociologist. Finally, the Russian Research Center is deeply concerned with the development of new methods of research in the field of Soviet studies. These new methods include, for example, special techniques for the evaluation of public opinion within the Soviet Union.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Organization of the Program

The research of the Center is based on the following principles: a) the research is interdisciplinary in character, that is, scholars in a wide variety of social science fields work on cooperative projects to which each one brings the point of view and research methods developed in his own field of study; b) the fields of anthropology, psychology and sociology, which have hitherto played little part in Russian studies, are strongly represented; c) while initially most of the research is being carried out along the lines firmly established in scholarship, the Center will also experiment in methods and approaches in an effort both to broaden the scope of Russian studies and to contribute to the methodology of the social sciences; d) the research will form a coherent whole and will be cumulative in content.

During the early months of operation, the Center concentrated on working out its long-range program. The chief vehicle for these discussions was a planning seminar, to which a number of visiting specialists, both British and American, contributed their suggestions. It was agreed to concentrate during the current academic year upon two major projects: 'A study of the Communist Party in Russia and an investigation of certain topics in the Russian economy. Both of these projects invite interdisciplinary work. The study of the Party demands historical, psychological, and sociological content and method, as well as political. The investigation of the economy includes topics such as standards of living, class stratification and income distribution, topics where sociologists must cooperate with economists. Similarly, a cultural anthropologist is describing Soviet exploitation of the Arctic in a manner that brings out the interdependence of natural resources, economic institutions and the more general culture patterns.

In addition to these central projects the Center is also carrying on certain smaller undertakings suggested by the availability of specially qualified personnel and unusual materials. For example, two Fellows who read both Chinese and Russian are working on the subject of Communist influence in China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One scholar is preparing a monograph upon Belorussia, and another upon the impact of the Soviet Union in Rumania.

The Center anticipates that most of its findings will be based on printed materials. However, during the summer of 1948 various American scholars carried on exploratory activities for the Center in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A Fellow is now engaged in an anthropological study in Finland. To the extent that opportunities seem to justify, work on published documents will be supplemented by field studies and interviewing programs in Europe and in the United States.

Publications

The Center plans a steady publication program. The following contributions by staff members are scheduled to appear by September, 1950:

A Study of the Discipline of Psychology in the Soviet Union (Raymond A. Bauer)
The Soviet Law of Foreign Trade, 2 vols. (Harold J. Berman)
Bibliography of Soviet State and Law (Harold J. Berman and Irene Hay)
Economic Developments in Rumania after the War (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen)
Structure and Development of Soviet Publications (Irene Hay)
The Economics of Soviet Railroad Policy (Holland Hunter)
"The Planning of Investment in the Soviet Union," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (Holland Hunter)
"The Post-War Role of the Communist Party," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* (Merle Fainsod)
"Analysis of Samo-kritica," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Alex Inkeles)
The Mobilization of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union (Alex Inkeles)
Socialism in one Country—A Study in Leninist Political Philosophy (Alfred F. Meyer)
Marxism and Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Authority (Barrington Moore, Jr.)
A Survey of English Language Research on the Soviet Economy (Harry Schwartz)
Dynamic Factors in Soviet Economic Development (Demitri B. Shimkin and others)
Peoples and Cultures of the Soviet North (Demitri B. Shimkin)
Physical Geography of the Soviet North (Demitri B. Shimkin)
Vertebrate Fauna of the Soviet North (Demitri B. Shimkin)
Mineral Self-Sufficiency in the Soviet Union (Demitri B. Shimkin)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Uranium Deposits in the USSR" (Demitri B. Shimkin)
Biographical Study of Count Nikolai Nikolaevich Muraviev, Governor General of Eastern Siberia (Joseph L. Sullivan)
Belorussia: The Rise of a Nation (Nicholas P. Vakar)
"Soviet Criticism of Dostoyevskii" (John C. Fiske)
"Family, Church and Nationality in Postwar Russia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Alex Inkeles)
"The United States in Recent Russian Economic Literature," *American Economic Review* (Evsey D. Domar)

Personnel

An Executive Committee is charged, under the Provost, with responsibility for the policies of the Russian Research Center. The members of this Committee are as follows:

Clyde Kluckhohn, Chairman (Director of the Russian Research Center and Professor of Anthropology)
Merle Fainsod (Chairman, Department of Government and Professor of Government)
Wassily W. Leontief (Professor of Economics)
Donald C. McKay (Chairman, Committee on International and Regional Studies and Professor of History)
Edward S. Mason (Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration and Professor of Economics)
Talcott Parsons (Chairman, Department of Social Relations and Professor of Sociology)

Professor Fainsod is serving as project director of the study of the Communist Party and Professsor Leontief is serving as project director for the studies in Russian economy. Michael Karpovich, Professor of History, was a member of the planning seminar and is a general advisor to the Center. The University has formally assigned all or a portion of the services of the following members of the faculty to the Center:

Isaiah Berlin, Research Associate and Visiting Lecturer on Regional Studies
Harold J. Berman, Research Associate and Visiting Professor of Law
Walter Galenson, Assistant Professor of Economics
Alexander Gerschenkron, Research Associate and Associate Professor of Economics
Alex Inkeles, Research Associate and Lecturer on Sociology
Barrington Moore, Jr., Research Associate and Lecturer on Sociology
Demitri B. Shimkin, Research Associate and Lecturer on Social Anthropology

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

M. Brewster Smith, Assistant Professor of Social Psychology
Adam B. Ulam, Instructor in Government

For 1948-49, in addition to the above staff ten graduate students who have completed all requirements for the doctorate except the thesis have been appointed to fellowships. They have been drawn from the Departments of Comparative Literature, Economics, Government, History, and Social Relations.

Communication and cooperation with scholars in the Russian field in other institutions is maintained by bringing consultants to the Center and by distribution of documents not ready for publication. Professor Evsey Domar of the Department of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and Professor Philip Taft of the Department of Economics at Brown University are actively collaborating in research undertakings of the Center.

Projects

Current projects (in addition to those covered by the list of contemplated publications) are as follows:

The Communist Party

Russian Influence on the Chinese Revolution (Conrad Brant and Benjamin Schwartz)
The Opposition in the Russian Communist Party, 1922-27 (Robert V. Daniels)
The Role of Communist Officials and Party Members in Soviet Literature (John C. Fiske)
Studies towards a History of International Communism (Joseph L. Sullivan)
Cominform (Adam Ulam)
Soviet International *Private* Law and its Interpretation by the Soviet Government (Charles Baroch)

The Russian Economy

Soviet Location Theory, with the Regional Approach (Willard Allen)
The Russian Coal Industry (Louis C. Boochever)
Economic Problems of the Soviet Iron and Steel Industry (M. Gardner Clark)
Dictionary of Russian Economic Terms (Alexander Gerschenkron)
Russian Economic History (Alexander Gerschenkron)
The Structure of Russian Industry (Donald R. Hodgman)
"Transportation in the Soviet Union" (Holland Hunter)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Study of Real Wages in the Soviet Union (Serge Propokovicz)
Labor in Pre-Soviet Russia (Walter Galenson and Philip Taft)
Labor in the Soviet Union (Walter Galenson and Philip Taft)
The Industrialization of the USSR: a Problem in the Development of a Backward Area (Warren Wilhelm)

Psychology and Social Life

A Study of the Psychology of Displaced Persons (Eduard Bakis)
Study of a Community in Karelia (Richard C. Sheldon)
A Study of Communication between the Soviet Union and Selected Major Powers in the Forensic Arena of the United Nations (M. Brewster Smith)
A Study of Soviet Influence on Culture Change in Russian Armenia (Rita Zakharian)

Miscellaneous

Soviet Central Asia (Joseph S. Berliner)
Certain Aspects of Soviet Agriculture (Albert E. Burke)
An Analytical Catalogue of Soviet Literary Authors and Critics (John C. Fiske)
The Study of Principles and Practices of City Planning in the USSR (F. Maurice Parkins)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED